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Abstract: A major issue in the field of moral psychology is identifying aspects of human 
morality that can be measured.  Kantor’s (1959) formulation of a psychological event 
provides a unique option for the field.  A psychological event evolves over time through 
the interaction of current situations and stimuli with historical interbehavioral processes.  
Kantor’s formulation of a psychological event has these elements interacting within the 
psychological field under review, but the space is undefined.  Stephenson (1982) offers Q 
methodology as a research tool to measure psychological events and does so by defining 
the psychological field within Hilbert space—a generalized Euclidean space where belief 
states of individuals are represented as vectors within the space.  Using the well-known 
Julie and Mark vignette (Haidt, 2001) about a sister and brother who decide to make love, 
this study investigates the viewpoints of participants, who are experts in moral 
philosophy and psychology, regarding the story.  In previous studies with the Julie and 
Mark vignette, participants were unable to articulate their beliefs about the event: this has 
led to the conclusion that people have intuitive moral reactions, but they often exhibit 
dumbfounding when they attempt to explain their intuitive reactions (Haidt, 2001).  This 
Q methodology study operationalized the subjective perspectives of participants in order 
to define their viewpoints. The stable viewpoints are defined with the data and show 
unique ways of framing the story and are Personal Autonomy, Human Nature, Outcomes, 
and Individuals in Context.  The interpretation of the findings defines these viewpoints 
and shows how they differ when the vignette is considered from different perspectives.  
By setting the psychological field within Hilbert space where quantum theory explicitly 
applies (Stephenson, 1982), the viewpoints can be used to define the features of belief 
projections as explained by the important work in quantum cognition and decision 
making. By defining participants’ viewpoints, this study shows that people are not 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
In order to provide an empirically defensible definition of morality, moral 
concepts are often extrapolated from the data collected during experimentation and 
measurement.  A large number of scales and tests are used—whether a researcher knows 
what the scale or test measures—because of the belief that something must first be 
measured before it can be studied scientifically (Stephenson, 1953).  Since it is assumed 
that the fundamental principles of the universe are well understood, the primary goal has 
simply been to sort out the details.  The essential measurement proposition is that the 
meaning of experimental data refers unambiguously to the properties of the measured 
object and not to the phenomenon of the system more broadly (Bohm & Hiley, 1993). 
This is a holdover from classical physics where there was never a serious concern with 
ontology or epistemology. Epistemology in the system was self-evident since 
measurement was simply a special case of the laws that applied to this universe, and the 
observing apparatus obeyed the same objective laws of what was being observed (Bohm 
& Hiley, 1993).  However, researchers do not simply observe what is there since “the 
boundaries between objects or stimuli are situation-dependent and subjectively-
determined” (Peterson, 2013, p. 2). 
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Much of the research in moral psychology has too eagerly taken assumptions from 
other areas of experimental science.  Many in moral psychology think that measurement has 
to do with assigning numerals to objects according to a particular rule, despite the fact that 
only quantitative attributes can be measured this way (Stevens, 1946).  This leads researchers 
to believe that the psychological attributes under investigation are in fact quantitative 
(Michell, 2004).  This is overly simplistic and ignores the fact that the “link connecting the 
experimental result with its meaning is indivisible, unpredictable and uncontrollable” (Bohm 
& Hiley, 1993).  This link is not purely quantitative, and the meaning of the result involves 
the complexity of a person’s subjective experience as it is lived out in the world.   
Background to the Problem 
Experimentation and measurement offer rich potential to the study of morality, but 
there can be an uncritical application of quantitative measurement in the field.  This can lead 
to an inability to articulate what is really true about the human experience, which causes 
errors in differentiating between preferences, social conventions, and morality.  With the 
decline in Kohlbergian-style moral psychology, there are new criticisms as to what role 
philosophy and psychology play in the exploration of morality.  Essentiall, the issue is a 
disagreement over the extent to which moral psychology needs to first address philosophical 
assumptions about morality.  Kohlberg (1980) thought it did, but Lapsley and Narvaez 
(2008) disagree that one ought to address the philosophical aspects of morality before doing 
research.  
In the Lapsley and Narvaez (2008) concept of psychologized morality, research is 
free from prior philosophical assumptions so that moral psychology is not operating with 
more restrictions than other types of psychological examinations (Kristjansson, 2009).  This 
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prevents a distortion of the scientific goal of finding objective truth (Kristjansson, 2009).  It 
yields a naturalized ethical theory, which helps avoid a misconception that “considerations 
about moral character as an ethical meta-construct and/or an educational ideal can be 
developed in isolation from empirical evidence on the lives of concrete person” 
(Kristjansson, 2009, p. 817).  Nevertheless, there are serious methodological problems 
plaguing this form of psychological research, and researchers should consequently be critical 
of adopting the moral world view that they produce.   
Many researchers in the past few decades have been busy creating postulates and then 
deducing conclusions to test by experiment.  This leads to deducing empirical laws from 
asserted systems of logic rather than discovering them (Stephenson, 1961).  This style of 
hypothetico-deductive investigation has been borrowed through analogy from other areas of 
science.  But, hypotheses were supposed to be grasped by observation and not by logic: they 
should be induced and not deduced (Stephenson, 1961).  The role of observation is limited to 
the time that the hypotheses are tested, not created, and consequently amounts to little more 
than finding difference between groups at the conclusion of an experiment (Stephenson, 
1961).  Research in the field would yield more important results from testing postulates and 
not from testing the hypotheses deduced from them.  Moreover, hypothetico-deductive 
research ignores the subjective experience of the participants in the research.   
An Example 
Jonathan Haidt (2001) outlines a dual process model in which emotion and reason are 
both mental constructs at play in decision making.  He has since extended this idea to ensure 
that intuition (a term he describes as being broader than emotion) is what is first and foremost 
functioning in moral decisions.  The idea is that individuals are flawed reasoners who look to 
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confirm their own pre-existing beliefs (Haidt, 2013).  Haidt (2001) provides four reasons for 
doubting the role of causal reasoning in moral judgments: (a) there are two cognitive 
processes, reasoning and intuition, and reasoning is overemphasized, (b) reasoning is often 
motivated, (c) reasoning constructs post hoc justifications, (d) moral action covaries more 
with moral emotion than with moral reasoning.  A key point is that people construct post hoc 
justifications for their behavior, and consequently any façade of objectivity is illusory.  Moral 
reasoning is not used to figure out what is really true or good, but rather it is used to prepare 
explanations that can be used to justify actions if called upon to do so (Haidt, 2013).   
Haidt, Bjorklund, and Murphy (2000) use a vignette about Julie and Mark as part of 
their experiment.  Julie and Mark are brother and sister who decide that it would be 
“interesting and fun” to have sex (p. 18).  The story provides assurance no one else will find 
out, that it will only happen once, and that enough protection is in place to avoid a 
pregnancy.  Participants were asked if Julie and Mark did anything wrong.  The experimenter 
then presented arguments to counter participants’ responses as a means of playing devil’s 
advocate.  The main counterargument was to remind participants that there was no harm 
identified in the story and that simply finding the action disgusting did not mean it was 
wrong.  It was expected that people would “make automatic, intuitive judgments, and then be 
surprised and speechless” as they tried to explain why they thought this act of incest would 
be wrong (Haidt et al., 2000, p .5).  The study found that most people believed that Julie and 
Mark having sex was wrong, but ultimately they had little to offer by way of explanation.  
That is, the participants demonstrated some form of moral dumbfounding—a phenomenon 
described in the study as happening when “strong intuition was left unsupported by 




 The study from Haidt et al. (2000) does not allow for the possibility that there might 
be something more to the domain of self than self-justification.  Since “articulated reasons” 
(p. 14) are so important to the research design, it would be expected that a more robust tool to 
measure participants’ viewpoints on the issue was put in place.  The only tool the study used 
to gather explanations of beliefs was an open ended question. If participants showed any 
indication of inexplicability as they responded, the researchers concluded that they had no 
explanation to offer.  Since many of the participants could not give an articulate explanation 
of their conclusions, especially in the face of an argumentative researcher, the researchers 
concluded that their hypothesis was true: that people were reacting intuitively to the Julie and 
Mark situation.   
The hypothetico-deductive model of research proves problematic here.  The a priori 
assumption that the brain has a dual-process nature of intuition and reason, and the postulate 
that the intuitive process was the one leading moral decision making, were never tested 
directly.    The only thing that the study did was to test a hypothesis deduced from the 
postulate.  Knowing that people generally disapprove of Julie and Mark having sex is by 
itself unhelpful in determining whether or not people are reasonable or intuitive when 
making moral judgments.  In function, it offers no real proof that the categories of intuition 
and reason are operational entities in the decision making process. 
The Problem with Categories  
 Experiments in psychology often rely on the assumption that particular mental 
categories exist (Smith, 2016).  In Haidt et al. (2000), the researchers assumed that intuition 
and reason are two categories of the mind.  Mind is a construct, though, and so intuition and 
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reason are constructs in reference to it.  Constructs are important in science but require a 
concrete reference to a thing or an event (Smith, 2016). Conceptualizing the brain as a 
psychological tool does not refer to an actual thing, but refers rather to a construct that draws 
connection to the biological function of the brain and its role in human behavior (Smith, 
2016).  Intuition and reason were the assumed categorical parameters in the Haidt et al. 
(2000) experiment, and so the goal was to figure out which one was working during the 
experiment—no other outcomes were experimentally possible. The postulate itself was never 
tested.  
What is lacking is a serious understanding of what is should be under investigation in 
the first place.  What should have been of primary concern in the Julie and Mark experiment 
is the psychological event of participants reading and operationalizing their viewpoints in 
response.  Instead, the focus was about confirming a hypothesis deduced from the 
assumption of mental categories.  Woodworth (1929) understood early on that psychological 
events should be of primary importance when he recommended using verbs rather than nouns 
to describe these events.  He says one should say “remembering” rather than talking about 
“memory,” or “thinking” instead of “thought” (p. 82). This is because the nouns are simply 
substitutions for verbs in these cases: the nouns do not refer to actual objects, but rather refer 
to activities.  Creating psychological systems on based on the assumption of categories leads 
to a breakdown in the system.  As, Stephenson’s (1961) writes: 
It is not enough to blame [the failure of the system] on the complexity of 
human conduct, or to seek a way out via statistical procedures of a dubious 
kind, played with chaotic postulates.  Perhaps psychology, in all its…years of 
systems, has been putting the wrong questions to man.  (p. 15) 
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Haidt et al. (2000) used the Julie and Mark vignette to explore the dual-process theory of the 
mind, but they never asked the most important question: is human thinking really explained 
by such a model?  The study should have avoided the adoption of untested assumptions at the 
start of the study.  This would have allowed for a more basic exploration of the psychological 
events of the participants reading the Julie and Mark dilemma.  A tool could have been used 
to explore what participants really believed about the story.  The tool cannot exist, though, 
without a thorough understanding of the nature of the human mind under investigation.  
What is required is research focused on psychological events without the assumption of pre-
existing mental categories.  Measurement should be on these events directly and not on 
hypotheses deduced from assuming that any categories exist.       
Expecting the Wrong Things from Measurement 
Asking the wrong questions begets the wrong kinds of information, and such is the 
nature of much of the current moral research.  MacIntyre (1984) notes this succinctly in 
stating that the social sciences “are predictively weak” and that they do not discover “law-
like generalization” (p. 89).  The failure to find predictive power in human decisions is not 
the fundamental problem of concern here; rather the fundamental problem is that the 
expectation of predictability in actions plagues the nature of experimentation in moral 
psychology.  Hence, the concept of generalization is used as a predictive conclusion and not 
as a tool for future use (Stephenson, 1961).  Despite the complexity of human morality, 
researchers in the field are busy trying to grasp lawfulness as conclusions and have not 
thought very much of “enunciating laws as mere rules to guide their inquiries into things” 
(Stephenson, 1961, p. 6).  For example, Stephenson (1953, 1961) outlines what he calls 
Freud’s Law, that “in conflictual situations the person may defend himself by anomalous 
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forms of behavior” (p. 7).  Stephenson (1961) discusses this law not as conclusion about 
human behavior, but as a tool to “know what to look for” (p. 6) in future explorations of 
human action.  Thus, the law is never operationalized directly in research, but it used to help 
guide what to look for moving forward.       
What one expects from theoretically derived laws today has everything to do with 
predictability and regularity—despite the relatively consistent failure to do so.   This is not to 
say that there are no general conclusions, since physics has done the difficult work of finding 
conclusions that do exist.  Perhaps some general conclusions exist in moral psychology as 
well.  This will be hard to find, though, with the current disregard for the nature of systems—
in this case, the nature of human consciousness—and an infatuation with hypothetico-
deductive measurement.  Human morality is more than the observations of single actions, 
since morality takes place through a self-reflective process of conscious human subjects over 
time. In this case, there must be something more valuable to measure regarding the moral life 
of individual people than single behaviors in single experiments.       
Statement of the Problem 
The fundamental problem that this research addresses is that researchers in moral 
psychology are not attending to the nature and function of the physical universe and of 
humans operating within it.  By ignoring a salient conceptualization of conscious 
communication, the goal of measurement in the field has been to make generalizations about 
human behavior from hypothetico-deductive hypotheses.  Because of the methodological 
approaches being used, the field does not have very much to say about the nature of the 
human experience as it is lived through an individual subject in specific contexts. In brief, it 
fails to measure actual psychological events.   
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Without an understanding of human nature, descriptions of the human condition get 
confused.  One aspect of confusion is the general problem moral psychologists have in 
distinguishing between preferences, social conventions, and morality.  Which actions get 
divided into which categories largely becomes a matter of personal preference, political 
agenda, or cultural trends.  Researchers doing this sort of work are explicitly convinced that 
their divisions are not arbitrary—such as Nucci (2009), for example—but the diversity of 
opinions has not led to consensus.  The concern, though, should be with finding empirically 
relevant things to say about psychological events.  Doing this would give researchers the 
ability to say something about the viewpoints that people have about behaviors as they are 
acted out in the real world.  These viewpoints could be grouped into factors of like-minded 
people.  These factors would create a valuable set of “categories” that could be used as a tool.  
The information that actual individuals can provide about their own subjectivity and the 
viewpoints they hold is often met with skepticism, but the field needs robust data from 
individuals as they communicate their own subjective perspectives.   
Theoretical Framework 
As basic postulate from Bohr and Stephenson is that there are two sciences, physics 
and psychology, and that quantum theory applies to both (Stephenson, 1989).  Essentially, 
then, there are three realms: the mental realm, the bodily realm, and the quantum realm.  
What has become clear in the last century is that the bodily realm is derived from the 
quantum realm with unexpected properties (Bohm, 1951; Rae, 1986).  What is theoretically 
important for the present research is that the mental realm is derived from the quantum realm.  
This is a departure from the current models of moral psychology that assume the mental 
realm is derived from the bodily realm in some form of behaviorism or functionalism 
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(McGinn, 1982). If the quantum realm is acknowledged at all, it remains irrelevant 
(Robinson, 1987).  The theoretical framework at play here is that both the mental and bodily 
realms are “different types of ordering of the underlying quantum ‘stuff’” (Marshall, 1989, p. 
15).  Forms of mind/body dualism are to be rejected in their classical formulations, and the 
problems that arise from them will be seen and corrected. 
 This rejection of traditional mind/body distinctions has a number of theoretical 
implications regarding the nature of consciousness.  Consciousness as an entity itself 
becomes less important than its ability to communicate the subjective experiences of actual 
people.  Mind comes into being as quanta (factors) of self-referent statements (Stephenson, 
1982).  The conscious mind is not a thing, like a brain which is an embodied material object.  
This type of consciousness must be investigated through the use of language that has as a 
central focus the self-reference of the one using it.  This research is concerned with self-
referential communication and the fact that the “mystery of consciousness, in which self-
reference is omnipresent, explicit or not” (Stephenson, 1993, p. 5.) needs to be part of the 
methodological approach.  This type of communication can be made with simple statements 
that are common to those with a shared linguistic culture.  Here it is clear how, like Kohlberg 
(1958) in his dissertation, the use of Q sorts can be valuable.  Q methodology, which was 
developed to use this language to operationalize the beliefs of participants, is theoretically 
important to the study of subjectivity.   
The mind is not derived from the body but both are derived from an underlying 
quantum reality.  The important part of consciousness is communicability of lived 
subjectivity.  This means that individuals can communicate the perspectives of their lived 
experiences in common terms, a fact that needs to be taken seriously in any discussion about 
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the moral dispositions of actual humans living out their lives in the real world.  Self-
referential communication is taken as an active process of the mind that can be measured in 
the context of actual events.   
What is theoretically and methodologically valuable is a centrality-of-self model.  
The focus on subjectivity has at its core a notion of communicability so the idea of 
consciousness and unconsciousness as categories can be dispensed with.  Theoretically, it is 
important to get rid of all the categories or faculties of the mind that researchers in moral 
psychology might typically use.  Rather, what are theoretically important are a person’s self-
referential comments or beliefs, made in relation to interactional situations (Stephenson, 
1953).  Theoretically, this can be articulated as an event-based approach to psychology 
(Smith, 2016), and can be measured with Q technique and its methodology (Brown, 1980).   
Quantum Theory and Q Methodology 
The present study examines quantum models of decision making and judgment that 
formalize decision making as belief state projections in Hilbert space.  A Hilbert space is a 
generalization of a Euclidean space where belief states of individuals are represented as 
vectors within the space (Pothos & Busemeyer, 2014: Trueblood, Yearsley, & Pothos, 2017).  
In doing this, the study will adopt a mathematical formalism of quantum theory to 
conceptualize decision making (Trueblood et al., 2017).  If, for example, someone thinks that 
Julie and Mark did something wrong, he projects his belief to the subspace for this 
viewpoint.  This subspace has features.  To define the features of these subspaces, the present 
research utilized Q methodology to give participants the opportunity to communicate their 
viewpoints about Julie and Mark did.  In this methodology, like-minded beliefs are grouped 
together and generalized giving way to viewpoints that can be described by the statements 
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that comprise it.  Q methodology, as defined by William Stephenson (1935), has its roots in 
quantum theory and specifically operates within a Hilbert Space.  In the model that is 
outlined for this research, people operationalize their viewpoints at the time of measurement 
to create belief states.  Q methodology is subjective and can holistically analyze self-referent 
beliefs about the Julie and Mark vignette. Likert-type scales result in rating single traits at a 
time, while Q methodology allows for the holistic examination of all the statements made 
about the vignette (Watts & Stenner, 2012).   
In previous studies with the Julie and Mark vignette, participants were asked to make 
a judgement, yes or no, about whether or not Julie and Mark did anything wrong.  Here, these 
beliefs are represented as vector subspaces in a Hilbert space of a quantum model of 
cognition.  By their nature, these vectors are informed by features that help define their 
spaces.  The inability of previous research to describe the features of the subspace is not a 
function of the mental process of the participants; rather, it is a problem with the research 
methodology.  To correct this, the multiple Q sorts are performed by participants under 
different conditions of instruction, which ask about the story from the perspective of other 
people, so that the participant can represent his own beliefs and his beliefs about what others 
might be thinking.  These sorts are analyzed through Q method in order to create factors that 
generalize the multiple perspectives into viewpoints.   
Use in Moral Psychology 
 This investigation is specifically concerned with the subjective experience of 
individual people working out their own moral lives.  Specifically, this research explores the 
nature of human consciousness as it operates in the context of individual people in the real 
world.  The science of consciousness will be brought to bear on the experimental design, and 
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the philosophy of morality will be used to discuss the findings.  The purpose of this model is 
to offer a correction to the methodological issues currently found within the field of moral 
psychology. 
 To do this, the study explains a methodology for subjective science.  This exploration 
does not deny objectivity nor is it mere subjectivism—it is rather a “mathematical-statistical 
key to what everyone calls ‘mind’” (Stephenson, 1993, p. 2).  In this case, the purpose is to 
specifically identify a scientifically defensible explanation of the moral quality of the human 
mind.  The purpose is not to represent mind as a thing or category, but to demonstrate that it 
is an abstraction from quantum phenomena that is best understood in the activity of 
psychological events.  As a function of moral psychology, it takes seriously the need for an 
autonomous psychology exploration that is free from overly burdensome presuppositions of 
moral philosophy.  The methodology will attend to the working of actual systems, that is, the 
function of psychological events.  Data from this type of experimentation will be viewed 
alongside normative philosophical claims about morality to enhance the discussion.   
Moreover, as a means of methodology, an outcome of the findings of this study is to 
show that scientific inquiry can be performed on a small group of participants.  To achieve 
the desired order at the time of testing, the procedures of the study is to shift away from 
sampling methodology, which has become very common in psychological research, and 
towards a methodology based on a just a few cases.  This methodology was used to sample 
possible beliefs about this particular case, and to explore a participant’s viewpoints on the 
Julia and Mark dilemma in a way that Haidt et al. (2000) could not do.  As it relates to moral 
psychology, the viewpoints that emerge through Q methodology offer a robust description of 
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a variety of perspectives such that one can engage the resultant viewpoints against 
expectations from normative moral philosophy.   
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research was to investigate the complex perspectives of expert 
participants regarding the Julie and Mark dilemma.   Using Q methodology, participants 
operationalize their beliefs to formally articulate their clear and stable moral viewpoints.  
These viewpoints define the features of subspaces, which are represented as belief 
projections in Hilbert space.   
Research Questions 
1)  What are the viewpoints that expert participants might express about the Julie and 
Mark vignette? 
2)  How do these viewpoints differ across multiple perspectives, which are sorted as 
various condition of instruction? 
3)  How do these viewpoints define the features of belief subspaces represented in 
Hilbert space? 
Definition of Key Terms 
Communicability: In the present study, communicability is the key function of 
consciousness (see consciousness).  Communication has two forms, one with self-reference 
and one without.  Without self-reference, communication is the transmission of objective 
information.  What is important here is individuals’ self-referential communicability of their 
viewpoints to provide “new sources of knowledge about oneself” (Stephenson, 1982, p. 240).  
There is no outside criterion for a person’s own point of view and so external concepts of 
validity do not apply to subjectivity (Brown, 1980). 
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Condition of Instruction: Refers to some rule under which a Q sort takes place. 
Each Q sort was performed under a condition of instruction that asked participants to 
consider the Julie and Mark vignette from different perspectives (see perspective). 
Connatural knowledge: Refers to a type of true knowledge which is not based on the 
perfect use of deliberate and fully aware faculties of reason, but rather on an inclination of 
the knowing subject to the subject known.  It is a deeply personal form of knowledge that 
considers that knowing is an act of the whole person who knows through his intellect, which 
is at times not fully cognitively aware (Maritain, 1943).  In some ways, it appears to be 
similar to intuitive knowledge, but will be distinguished from an intuition.     
Consciousness: Refers not to a thing itself, but to a function, i.e. communicability 
(see communicability).  In consciousness, self-referential communication is omnipresent 
and measureable through Q methodology. Consciousness communicates information about 
the self, which is a source of knowledge, as understood by connatural knowledge.   
Hilbert space:  Refers to a vector space with an inner product operation (Busemeyer 
& Bruza, 2012) that allows length and angle to be measured.  The inner product operation 
associates each pair of vectors with a scalar quantity—the inner product of the vectors.  The 
inner product between vectors can be zero, and so it can define orthogonality between 
vectors.   
Intuition: Is a “gut feeling” or passions that are often mistaken for the products of 
reason (Haidt, Bjorklund, and Murphy, 2000, p. 3).  They are understood to include a number 
of automatic and uncontrollable cognitive processes, which are largely “outside the control of 
consciousness and independent of reasoning” (p. 3).  Intuitions are distinguished from 
connatural knowledge in that they do not carry the epistemic weight of true knowledge. 
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Q methodology: Refers to the subjective, holistic interpretation of factor arrays that 
emerge from analysis of the data (Brown, 1980).  The methodology, considered as having 
both a method and a technique (see definitions below), creates operant factors—factor arrays 
free from constructive effects (Stephenson, 1977)—from the measurement of participants’ 
psychological events.  These events, which are responses to the Julie and Mark vignette from 
differing perspective, takes place within a psychological field defined in Hilbert space.  
Quantum theory applies to this formulation of a psychological event. 
Q method: Refers to statistical methods used during the process of analysis 
(McKeown & Thomas, 2013).  For this study, a principal component analysis and varimax 
rotation were used.  A varimax rotation is a method of rotating the orthogonal base resulting 
in a small number of large loadings (Kaiser, 1958).  The final statistical step in Q method is 
the standard score calculation of each statement within each factor to be used for 
methodological interpretation. 
Q Technique: Refers to the method and methodology of sorting statements onto a 
form (Watts & Stenner, 2012). For this study, there were 41 statements with a distribution 
ranging from -5 to +5.   
Quantum model of cognition: Is a mathematically principled view of cognition that 
does not rely on “tool box” models like heuristics and biases.  It visualizes belief states 
within Hilbert space (see Hilbert space above) and displays changes in belief states as 
projections to vector spaces within the decision space for a particular decision.  In the Julie 
and Mark vignette, Julie and Mark projected their belief state to the vector for yes they did 
want to make love.  The discussion of quantum cognition for the present study does not treat 
the mind as a literal quantum computer.  Rather, it applies abstract, mathematical principles 
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of quantum theory to inquire about decision making in cognitive science (Busemeyer, 
Pothos, Franco, & Trueblood, 2011). 
Viewpoint: Refers specifically to the stabilized factor arrays that emerged from the 
study.  A viewpoint is defined through interpretation of the descriptive explanation of the 
factor array of statements for each factor.  Generally, it is used to discuss the beliefs of 
participants.   
Perspective: For this study, perspective refers to thinking about the vignette through 
a particular lens.  Specifically, through the lens of the sorter himself or from that of another 
person.  This was done through conditions of instruction that allowed participants to take the 
various standpoints of other people.  Participants gave their own perspective and the 
perspectives of Julie, Mark, their most impulsive selves, etc.  Ten conditions of instruction or 
perspectives were sorted by the participants.   
Psychological event: Refers to a cognitive episode which has a stimuls function and 
a response function within a unique interbehavioral situation (Kantor, 1959). It includes 
historical interbehavioral processes are included within psychological events, which can also 
account for a particular medium of interbehavior.  In each psychological situation, there is a 
psychological field which consists of the entire system of factors in interaction.  The 
psychological field is defined by Q methodology’s theory that such an event can be 









REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
In previous research with the Julie and Mark vignette, participants were unable to 
explain their viewpoints (Haidt, 2001).  The purpose of this research was to investigate 
the complex perspectives of expert participants regarding the Julie and Mark dilemma.   
Research question 1 asks: What are the viewpoints that expert participants might express 
about the Julie and Mark vignette?  To do this, the literature review explores the concept 
of the mind that led to the previous error in measurement and then offers a correction so 
that a methodology to measure can be implemented.  The section The Primacy of 
Judgments in Moral Psychology defines what it is moral psychology should be 
attempting to measure.  It reviews the dual-process theories of the mind and the Social 
Intuitionist Model and describes their failures and provides a methodologically stable 
view of human cognition.  In the section, Bias and Epistemic Justification, a quantum 
model of mind is offered that has direct application to the measurement of the first 
research question.  It articulates the Issues with Classic Physics and Consciousness as 
Embodied Cognition and gives a solution with a quantum model of the implicate order. 
Consequently, the chapter defines Human Subjectivity and its Communicability in a 
way that is methodologically operational. 
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What is of particular importance to this research is the idea of a psychological 
event, which is defined in section Psychological Events.  Research question three asks: 
How do these viewpoints define the features of belief subspaces represented in Hilbert 
space?  To do this, the chapter defines Hilbert space and the quantum theory that applies 
to it in the Quantum Decision Making section.  In the section Re-Framing the Julie 
and Mark Vignette, the quantum notion of cognition and the methodological focus on 
people communicating their own subjectivity come together.  The chapter makes it clear 
that the first and third research questions can be explored, given an appropriate view of 
cognition, by a methodology that takes judgments and psychological events seriously.  
The second research question asks: How do these viewpoints differ across multiple 
perspectives, which are sorted as various condition of instruction?  This chapter 
demonstrates that this type of perspective taking is possible through self-referential 
communicability.   
Morality is a uniquely human phenomenon.  This is specifically a function of the 
conscious self-awareness that only humans have.  Humans are rational animals: they have 
passions and instincts like animals, but also an intellect that allows them to act with 
knowledge of their own behaviors (Maritain, 1943).  Humans orient their plans and 
actions towards future goals which, at their core, correspond to the essential constitution 
of their nature (Maritain, 1943).  The ontological structure of human nature is composed 
of man’s intellectual necessities and leads to man’s future ends (Maritain, 1943).   
While there is something relatively mundane and arbitrary about individual 
human actions, the totality of human behavior is more meaningful.  Individual behaviors 
serve a larger function within the totality of normal human functioning, which is 
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coextensive with the whole field of natural regulations of behavior within all people 
universally (Maritain, 1943).  There is an ideal aspect to this because it requires an 
intelligence that attends to an unchanging structure of human nature.  The complexities of 
individual action might lead to a belief that the ontology of human nature and a striving 
towards an ideal is not always at play.   
Many studies in moral psychology seem to be more concerned with single actions 
that are only nebulously connected to actual morality.  Much of the research in moral 
psychology has a difficult time distinguishing between social norms and actual morality 
for that reason.  Identifying which specific actions violate social norms and which violate 
moral ones has more to do with philosophy than psychology.  Furthermore, predicting 
how people will behave in different situations is an unsuccessful research paradigm that 
will not be taken up here.  But the concept of morality as it relates to human nature more 
broadly is important because it is conscious self-awareness that is the beginning of the 
moral self.  Thus, the defining features of moral judgements are important to moral 
psychology. 
The Primacy of Judgements in Moral Psychology 
The “primary psychological referent of the term ‘moral’ is a judgement, not a 
behavior or an effect” (Kohlberg, 1980, p. 53).  Moreover, morality needs to be defined 
in terms of the formal character of a moral judgement or a moral viewpoint, which is best 
seen in “the reason given for a moral judgement” (Kohlberg, 1980, p.53).  The formal 
character of a moral judgement such as the one that people make after hearing about Julie 
and Mark is important to moral psychology.   
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A distinction between moral judgments and cognitive-predicative judgements is 
an important distinction to maintain (Kohlberg, 1980).  The ability to predict future 
events or future behaviors has been at the heart of decision making research for a long 
time.  For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) described three heuristics employed 
in making judgments: representativeness, which are usually employed when people are 
asked to judge the probability that an object or even A belong to class or process B; 
availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to 
assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and 
adjustment from an anchor, which is employed in numerical predications when a relevant 
value is available (p.1131).  
A focus on these types of predictive judgments is not what is of concern for this 
research in moral psychology.  A quantum model of decision making introduces the issue 
that judgements disturb each other and create uncertainty in subsequent judgments 
(Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012).  In the Q methodology used in this research, a person 
operationalizes a belief at the time he performs a Q sort and thus creates the belief.  The 
creation of this definite belief state, however, can mean that it is indefinite to subsequent 
judgments.   Consequently, it is not possible to define a joint probability to two questions 
A and B if question A creates an uncertain response for question B; instead, it is only 
possible to assign a probability to the sequence of answers to question A followed by 
question B (Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012).   
A heuristic model similar to the adjustment from an anchor (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974) was proposed by Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) where a new state of 
belief equals the previous (anchor) state plus an adjustment.  The model fails to 
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reproduce the correct ordering across all conditions, and also contains many other 
substantial quantitative predictive errors demonstrating the challenge of such models to 
account for uncertainty (Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012). 
Q methodology is not used to make predictions about future beliefs or behaviors.  
The purpose, rather, is to define the formal character of viewpoints as they are 
operationalized in response to a particular condition of instruction.  This supports 
Kohlberg’s (1980) definition of moral judgements as distinct from predictive ones.  It 
makes description the goal of the research inquiry.  The reasons given for moral 
judgments like what Julie and Mark did was wrong, provide the features of the 
judgement.  Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer (1983) state that “moral reasoning is the 
conscious process of using ordinary moral language” (p. 69); the present study uses 
ordinary moral language to explore people’s viewpoints. 
A Failure to Define Features 
 There are many reasons that researchers might be unable to define the features of 
judgments.  The specific failure for Haidt (2001) comes from the model he adopts 
regarding the Julie and Mark vignette.  His model, the Social Intuitionist Model, is a 
misuse of the broader dual-process model of the mind.  The subsequent review of the 
literature will show why both are unhelpful constructions for the issue at hand: defining 
features of judgments.   
 Dual-process models. The work of Kahneman (2003) has been influential in 
supporting a dual process model of the mind and is part of the larger work of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) on heuristics and biases.   In this theory, people apprehend reality 
through two systems: a fast System 1 of intuitive thinking which is automatic, and a slow 
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System 2 in which thinking is analytical and deliberative (Västfjäll & Slovic, 2013).  In 
Kahneman’s (2003) model, the intuitive operations of System I generate impressions 
which are neither voluntary nor verbally explicit (p. 699) and which can be distinguished 
from judgments.  Judgments are always “intentional and explicit even when they are not 
overtly expressed” (p. 699).  This places judgments within System 2 whether they 
originate with impressions or from deliberate reasoning (Kahneman, 2003).  The 
Rationalist Model, as seen in Kohlberg’s (1969) work, argues that moral judgments are 
the products of System 2.  Kohlberg’s theory has judgements as a product of a rational 
and cognitive process.   
 Social Intuitionist Model.  The Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) of moral 
judgement places moral judgements within System 1 such that they are the product of a 
non-rational intuitive process (Haidt, 2001; Haidt, 2007; Haidt and Bjorklund, 2008).  
This model appeals to the concept of moral dumbfounding in which participants have 
moral convictions for which they have no articulated justification (Haidt & Hersh, 2001).  
Dumbfounding was offered as the reason why participants in previous research with the 
vignette believed that Julie and Mark did something wrong but were unable to describe 
why they held the belief (Haidt, 2001).  Haidt (2001) accepts that reasoning can be used 
to influence judgements, but argues that this rarely takes place.  Consequently, the SIM 
holds that most moral judgements arise as a function of System 1.   
Problems with SIM and other Dual-Process Theories  
 There are a number of problems with the dual-process theory that preclude it from 
consideration here.   First, the dual-process theory over simplifies the complexity of the 
human mind by reducing it to two systems.  Certainly, these two systems are meant to 
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compartmentalize complex thinking under easy to comprehend boxes; but this type of 
reductionism is ultimately not helpful to moral psychology.  Second, reductionist theories 
of the mind tend to be overtly linear and claim to offer a straight line of cause and effect 
from the brain to physical action: this comes at a cost of “neglecting interdependent 
actions” (Smith, 2016).   Third, a theory of mind that is only understood as a physically-
dependent construct ignores quantum theory and the contextual/personal interdependency 
of behaviors.   
Bias and Epistemic Justification 
 Haidt (2001) argues that “the roots of human intelligence, rationality, and ethical 
sophistication should not be sought in our ability to search for an evaluate evidence in an 
open and unbiased way” (p. 821).  When it is possible for reasoned judgment to influence 
intuitions, Haidt (2001) is concerned about the biased nature of this reasoning.  He 
articulates two major classes of motivations that have been shown to bias and direct 
reasoning: relatedness motives, which deals with impression management and smoother 
interactions with other people, and coherence motives, which include a variety of 
defensive mechanisms triggered by cognitive dissonance and threats to the validity of a 
previously held view (p. 1033).  Moreover, he finds most explanations of intuitive 
judgements to be post-hoc rationalizations rather than causal.  His concept of moral 
dumbfounding leads him to belief that people do not have access to the process behind 
their intuitive judgement.  Consequently, any response they do have would constitute a 
justification made by consulting a priori moral theories (p. 1035).  These moral theories 
are a “pool of culturally supplied norms for evaluating and criticizing the behavior of 
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others” (p. 1035).  What was a play the whole time, though, are the moral emotions and 
intuitions that are really driving people to make decisions.   
 Curiously, Haidt (2001) is suspicious of human reason, but thinks that quick 
mental processes like intuitions are generally quite accurate.  There is not a good reason 
to assume, however, that intuition is exempt from the same biases that plagues reason.  
Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, and Chen (1996) demonstrate the possibility that the relatedness 
and coherence motives can influence intuition in the same way as reason, for example.  It 
would also be important to show that these motives constitute a bias each time they 
appear.  
Epistemic Justification 
 Liao (2010) reframes the discussion of bias within the work of epistemic 
justification.  He summarizes the general concept along the following lines: if someone 
X, is epistemically justified in believing P, then X is not biased about P; and if X is 
biased about P, then X is not epistemically justified in believing P (p. 16).  Alston (1985) 
provides a standard account of epistemic justification as depending in part on whether 
one has adequate evidence for P and if the judgement was in fact based on that evidence.   
 In exploring the relatedness motivation—though it could work for both friends 
and non-friends—one finds a common tendency to agree with friends and allies (Haidt, 
2001).  That is to say, if one’s friend makes a moral judgement against P, it could cause 
him to take a critical attitude towards P as well.  The important question, though, is 
whether or not a tendency to be motivated to agree with a friend or ally is always a bias.  
Liao (2010) argues that it is not, since a friend whom you might be motivated to agree 
with has probably sufficiently demonstrated that he is someone who should be believed.  
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That is, he has consistently provided evidence of careful thinking, of the exercise of 
intellectual virtues, and the like.  This is precisely why two people might be trusted 
friends who talk about particular subjects.  There is not research to show that a tendency 
to agree with friends is motivated by agreeableness and ease of conversation rather than 
for the reasons of trustworthiness mentioned above.   
Beyond Intuition for Epistemic Weight 
 Haidt (2001) argues that the purpose of reasoning is to provide a biased basis for 
justifications.  If reasoned thinking is not always biased, there would be good reason to 
be suspicious of the SIM.  More than SIM, the dual-process model of thinking can be 
disregarded all together.  In dispensing with the System 1 and System 2, a different 
conceptualization of judgement making can be utilized.  This concept, connatural 
knowledge, can be described in similar terms to intuition but also carries with it epistemic 
weight.  Judgements from this type of knowledge are often difficult to define as well, 
since it comes from deeply embedded information.  Nevertheless, it provides evidence for 
making epistemically justified judgements and it can be defined to give the features of the 
judgments.  
The old concept of connatural knowledge has some superficial similarities with 
the concept of intuition.  Maritain (1943) noticed, though, that William James’ interest in 
intuition never did draw on the older notion of connaturality, a clarification that he 
laments would have explained his teaching on the subject.  Reference to connatural 
knowledge has to do with knowledge not by facts or figures that one can learn, but by a 
particular inclination ingrained into the mind.  This is how people can give an account of 
the moral life even without explicitly referring to a formal moral philosophy.  In some 
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ways, this sounds a lot like the distinctions made in dual-process theories between system 
one (intuition) and system two (reason).  Some distinctions need to be articulated, then, 
that move past mere arguments of semantics.   
Intuition is an embodied process of affective responses (Haidt, 2001; Haidt & 
Bjorkland, 2008).  Intuition relates to a type of knowing that can be described as a gut 
feeling, and in this way, shows that it has less to do with knowledge than it does instinct.  
It is a socially useful category because it does explain something particularly primal 
about human interactions in the real world.  Essentially it posits that humans have an 
“innate preparedness to feel flashes of approval or disapproval toward certain patters of 
events involving other human beings” (Haidt & Joseph, 2004, p. 56).  Haidt and Joseph 
(2004) say that this is especially true for issues of suffering, hierarchy, reciprocity, and 
purity.  According to their theory, these modules provide “flashes of affect” when certain 
patterns are encountered by a person in a particular situation (p. 63).  These flashes are 
not virtues, but tools in the construction of future virtues.     
Connatural knowledge differs from intuition because it does not simply manifest 
as an embodied affective response: it is a form of true knowledge from human nature 
more directly.  This type of knowledge is not the same as intuition, but rather it becomes 
intuitive (Maritain, 1943); it comes from a prior place and makes itself known intuitively 
through the emotions.  The concept of emotion also needs clarification: emotion as it 
relates to intuition has to do with triggered episodes of affective response, not an 
enduring state (Moors & Scherer, 2013).  Emotion for Maritain (1943) is distinguished 
from this in terms of referring to personality traits and moods which have more to offer to 
evaluative judgments (Forgas & Koch, 2013).  Connatural knowledge is a deeper and 
28 
 
more fully articulated concept than the embodied notion of intuition or instinct.  The 
philosophical distinction between these concepts might not be as clear as what will be 
seen in the distinction between the quantum mind and the embodied mind, though, since 
it will be seen that connatural knowledge is a distinctly quantum phenomenon.   
Intuition has more to do with automatic responses and gut feelings.  Intuition is 
cognitive in so much as it is pattern-recognizing, but does not represent a form of true 
knowledge.  Connatural knowledge has an aspect of “some flash of reality” like intuition, 
but it is born in the “preconscious life of the intellect” and has an aspect of true 
subjectivity within it (Maritain, 1943, p. 15).  In contrast with intuition, the “flash” does 
not result in simply a feeling of approval or disapproval, rather: 
This unconceptualizable knowledge…causes the intellect obscurely to grasp some 
existential reality as one with the Self it has moved, and by the same stroke all 
that which this reality, emotionally grasped, calls forth in the manner of a sign: so 
as to have the self known in the experience of the world and the world known in 
the experience of the self, through an intuition which essentially tends towards 
utterance and creation. (Maritain, 1943, p. 19).  
This trend towards utterance and creation is a unique response that has 
implications for experimentation.  When a person makes a moral decision, he takes into 
account more than just what factual knowledge he has available to him; but he also takes 
more into account than just the flashes of emotional approval or disapproval that might 
present themselves as affective triggers. He takes into account what he knows of himself 
by essence of his being, connaturally, as it is expressed in his own subjective perspective.  
This type of knowledge is difficult to put into words (as Haidt identifies with intuition), 
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but finding a way to do so is expressly important to the measurement of moral viewpoints 
as they relate to the subjective identities and experiences of individuals.   
Human nature that has both an ontological structure and an ideal goal.  This 
nature is common to all people and is made evident to each through connaturality.  
Knowing through connaturality is a private and automatic process that is difficult to 
express in words.  It is a fundamental aspect of human consciousness which guides 
individuals towards the goals they have for their future selves as they live out their own 
subjectivity in the real world.  Consciousness need not be conceptualized as an entity in 
itself, but is best understood through its constant movement and communication to the 
individual who possesses it.    
The essential difference intuition and knowing connaturally is that intuition does 
not carry epistemic weight.  Nagel (2012) defends intuitions as having epistemic weight 
by equating them with perceptions.  She argues that reliable judgments form the basis of 
sound evidence and that perceptions are reliable.  She draws a connection between 
intuition and perceptions and concludes that intuitions, like perceptions, have epistemic 
weight.  Weinberg (2007), however, argues the contrary.  Although perceptions can be 
fallible, like intuitions, intuitions suffer from unmitigated fallibility—“a fallibility that 
uncompensated by a decent capacity for detecting and correcting errors that it entails” 
(Weinberg, 2007, p. 327).  This seems to be the case for the intuitions as they are 
described by Haidt (2001).  So, while the philosophical literature is robust, making the 
distinction between intuition and knowing connaturally is sufficient in this case to make 
the point.   
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The philosophical assumptions that attend to the nature and function of humans 
are valuable to moral psychology.  The goal of the type of psychological work being 
advocated for in the present study is the measurement of psychological events.  This 
requires understanding the nature of human psychology.  The present study does not need 
are a priori assumptions from philosophy that confuse human nature.  Haidt et al. (2000), 
researches deduced a hypothesis about feeling disgusted during judgments from a 
postulate that intuition was primarily driving moral decision making.  This, as mentioned, 
was methodologically faulty since it never tested the postulate.  The postulate was 
imported from an a priori philosophical assumption of David Hume’s that said “morality 
is determined by sentiment” (Hume, 1751/1983).  The quality of a postulate built on such 
an assumption is only as strong as the assumption itself.  The assumption about 
sentiments taken from Hume launched Haidt et al. (2000) down an unfruitful path.  
Consequently, only those assumptions about human nature that lead to an appropriate 
methodological tool for the study of psychological events will be considered here.   
Consciousness as Quantum Subjectivity  
In distinguishing between intuition and connatural knowledge, two different 
conceptualizations of consciousness emerge.  Intuition as instinct and gut response has at 
its core a very embodied notion of mind and cognition.  In this view, the mind is seen as 
the totality of neurological responses to physical stimuli.  In contrast, the mind that can 
know through connaturality is much more complex and requires an explanation apart 





Issues with Classical Physics and Consciousness as Embodied Cognition 
In a push to naturalize moral psychology, many in the field have been looking to 
science for answers.  Science offers many researchers a way to dispense with the 
outdated traditionalism of folk morality and organized religion (Johnson, 2014).  The 
goal of this sort of inquiry is to create a defensible naturalized ethic (Kristjánsson, 2009).  
In an effort to be free of any preconceived notions from philosophy or theology, the focus 
is explicitly materialistic and rejects any appeal to concepts of the mind that place 
consciousness to exist outside the natural world (Edel, 2001, p. 3).  In some attempts at a 
purely naturalistic morality, there is even a rejection of any type of distinction between 
human nature and culture.  Johnson (2014) denies such a distinction since his view of 
human nature has only to do with the bodily and physical aspects of a person, which he 
claims are inseparable from their cultural, i.e. social and moral, functions.   
The advantages of a naturalistic approach are, theoretically, that what arises from 
experimentation comes without the stain of presupposition.  When philosophical 
assumptions drive experimentation, the design is only as strong as the assumptions.  
Embracing philosophical assumptions is often deliberate like with Haidt (2001) and 
Kohlberg (1980); but it is often accidental, a fact demonstrated by those who are more 
careless in their adoption of prior moral psychological models.  Sanderse (2012) is an 
example of this, since he thinks he is doing something along the lines of Aristotelian 
character modeling, but in essence he is burdened by the weight of accidental Kantian 
presuppositions.   
If moral psychology ought not import too many philosophical assumptions at the 
start, it should not disregard those a priori assumptions that are valuable to the 
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development of methodology.  The discussion of philosophical assumptions above shows 
that few presuppositions need to be made in moral psychology, but that slight variations 
in assumptions about human nature lead to huge impacts on research.  Take for instance 
Johnson’s (2014) rejection of the idea that moral conduct has to do with discerning ideal 
moral truths from human reason or some other transcendental source.  This rejection is 
overly simplifies the potential origins of moral truth.  First, discursive reasoning is not the 
only means of human knowledge (as mentioned above with knowing connaturally).  
Second, transcendental sources are not the only non-physical entities that exist (as will be 
seen shortly).   
By demanding that consciousness be rejected apart from its embodied status is a 
faulty supposition for moral psychology.  Again, slight variations in what is accepted 
about human nature result in big diversions in methodology as seen in the following idea 
about human nature: 
“Mind” and “body” are not two different, independent metaphysical entities or 
dimensions; rather, they are abstractions we make, for various purposes, from the 
embodied flow of human engagement with the environment. (Johnson, 2014, p. 
24) 
He is correct that “mind” is an abstraction that is made for various purposes.  He is 
incorrect in stating that it is an abstraction from the embodied flow of human 
engagement.  In saying this, Johnson articulates the irony of many models of naturalistic 
moral psychology: that they intend to fix what they consider to be outdated models of 
folk morality by using outdated science.  Mind is an abstraction, but it is an abstraction of 
the implicate order of the universe.   
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The Implicate Quantum Nature of Human Consciousness 
The concept of an implicate order comes from David Bohm’s work in quantum 
mechanics.  While a number of the advances in quantum physics and experimentation 
were computationally valuable, they did little to offer an explanation of the universe as a 
whole.  Bohm and Einstein had a number of conversations about physics, and both shared 
the belief that the overall goal of their work was to say something meaningful about the 
reality that exists apart from oneself (Pylkkänen, 1989).  Bohm was dissatisfied that 
quantum theory could provide algorithms for doing experimental work, but that it could 
not offer a physical account of individual quantum processes (Bohm & Hiley, 1993).  A 
purely epistemological focus of quantum theory ignores reality and does not give an 
account of the ontology of the universe (p. 2).   
To create an ontological interpretation of quantum theory, Bohm understood that 
describing reality is the key.  By accepting both a wave function and a theory of particles, 
Bohm and Hiley (1993) are able to give “a coherent treatment of the entire domain 
covered by quantum theory” (p. 3) that leads to the same statistical results as other 
quantum theories that focus only on experimental calculations.  In this interpretation, 
there is an undivided wholeness to the universe that has as a basic property the movement 
inherent in the wave function (Pylkkänen, 1989; Bohm & Hiley, 1993).  The movement 
of the universe has in its motion the unfolding and enfolding the physical world.  The 
external world that is perceived by humans is the unfolded, or explicate, order of the 
university (Pylkkänen, 1989; Bohm & Hiley, 1993).  This is the physical reality from 
which proponents of embodied cognition draw their theory.  For materialists, the 
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explicate order is the only order that exists in the universe. Therefore, mind is an 
abstraction of a physical phenomenon (Johnson, 2014). 
For Bohm and Hiley (1993), it is not the explicate order that is primary; rather, it 
is the enfolded, or implicate, order that is key.  The movement of the universe enfolds its 
information and then unfolds it in a constant process.  Bohm (1990) describes it this way: 
The whole universe is in some way enfolded in everything and that each thing is 
enfolded in the whole.  This implies that in some way, and to some degree, 
everything enfolds or implicates everything.  However, this takes place is such a 
manner that under typical conditions of ordinary experience, there is a great deal 
of relative independence of things. (Bohm, 1990, p. 237)    
Taking an example of a room, light waves of enfolded information present themselves to 
an observer’s eyes. The information is unfolded through the process of perception and 
provides information about the explicate reality of the room (Pylkkänen, 2004).   
What is both philosophically and methodologically important for the issue at hand 
is that mind is better represented as an abstraction of the implicate order than it is of the 
explicate order.  Simply stated, consciousness and quantum theory have the implicate 
order in common (Bohm & Hiley, 1993).  Just as physical bodies are enfolded and 
unfolded in the process of quantum movement, thoughts move into one’s mind and fade, 
only to come back again.  This mental movement from the implicate to the explicate 
order gives rise to the relative stability of thoughts over time (Bohm, 1990), and has 
implications for how one tries to measure the types of psychological events at play in the 
human mind.   
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An example of this that Bohm and Hiley (1993) give is that of listening to music.  
While a specific number of notes are being played at a given time, a number of previous 
notes are still “reverberating” (p. 382) in one’s consciousness as he listens.  The 
reverberation of individual and separate notes can account for the immediate sense of 
movement that one feels about the music as he works to apprehend the particular patterns 
and qualities of the music.  To hear individual notes far enough apart in time would 
destroy this sense of an undivided whole altogether (Bohm & Hiley, 1993).  So there are 
individual notes, which carry particular facts and pieces of information; but the flow of 
all of the notes brings a more valuable whole together—namely in this case, a particular 
song.  The individual particles of sound as they are unfolded in time become the totality 
of the song as all of the information is enfolded.  The enfolded and unfolded nature of the 
song has a particular complementary nature that is unable to be divided.  The nature of 
consciousness, it is argued, has more to do with the implicate nature of a whole song than 
it does the explicate soundings of individual notes.   
Human Subjectivity and its Communicability 
The models of human thinking and morality adopted from classical physics treat 
the human mind as a mechanistic, albeit complex, structure; but it ignores the inward 
perception of the self (Pylkkänen, 1989).  This has consequences for moral psychologists 
because the inward perception of self is functionally important in the creation and 
application of tools to measure psychological events.  Consciousness as a construct can 
be rejected in the classical systems because it is seen as an abstraction of bodily processes 
(Johnson, 2014), which can be explained by non-subjective events such as reflex systems 
or reinforcement contingencies (Stephenson, 1968).  Classical science can deal with the 
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non-subjective, but not with subjective events (Stephenson, 1968).  What is being argued 
for from the quantum model, however, is that consciousness is the very “core and 
substance of psychology” and that a place can be found for it in subjectivity (Stephenson, 
1968, p. 499).  Consciousness as an entity itself is not needed, rather, individual 
subjectivity is retained (Stephenson, 1968; Stephenson, 1989).   
Saying that consciousness does not need explained as an entity itself takes away 
the hold that embodied cognition has on it.  What subjectivity takes as primary is not 
consciousness as a construct, but rather its ability to communicate. In this way, a theory 
of communication conjoins the only genuine, non-categorical, theory of self (Stephenson, 
1980).  This solves the issue of a priori mental categories becoming erroneous postulates 
within psychological investigations, and it reclaims an individual’s ability to 
communicate his own self-referential perspectives.  Although so much of the theoretical 
work up to this point has used the term “consciousness,” it has now become clearer what 
is exactly meant by it.  The fundamental concern is with subjectivity and one’s ability to 
communicate self-referential perspectives.  In the words of Stephenson (1968), 
“consciousness is dead: long live subjectivity” (p. 501). 
Complementarity and the Need for a Quantum Approach to Subjectivity 
Stephenson (1986) notes that the concept of complementarity was introduced by 
William James in 1891 and by Niels Bohr in 1927 as a phenomena experienced as “gaps” 
in thought, and “by the experiential observation that thought is divisible into transitive 
and substantive parts” (Stephenson, 1986, p.519).  This is an important concept in 
understanding the need for a quantum explanation of subjectivity.  Essentially, 
complementarity is the phenomenon that objects often have complementary properties 
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that canned be observed and measured at the same time.  This is the case with trying to 
measure the substance and the transition of thoughts.  Writing on this concept, James 
(1891) says: 
I have already said that the breach from one mind to another is perhaps the 
greatest breach in nature.  The only other breaches that can well be conceived to 
occur within the limit of a single mind would be either interruptions, time-gaps 
during which the consciousness went out altogether to come into existence again 
at a later moment; or there would be breaks in the quality, or content, or the 
thought, so abrupt that the segment that followed had no connection whatever 
with the one that went before. (p. 237) 
Consciousness is not actually fractured in the way that it often appears from 
human thinking; rather, it flows continuously in living human subjects.  But people often 
perceive their own thinking as pausing and flowing at different times and so James 
identified these as the transitive and substantive parts of thought.  These two concepts 
were central to his idea of complementarity as he noted the peculiarity of the human 
mind, “There is a gap therein; but no mere gap…it is a gap that is intensely active” 
(James, 1891, p. 251).  This was seen in the example of listening to music above (Bohm 
& Hiley, 1993).   
A thought or idea typed out and printed on paper has a particular substantive 
element—this element has a single meaning.  James (1891) uses the sentence, “Columbus 
discovered America in 1492” (p. 275) to demonstrate the single meaning of a sentence.  
In its substantive form, it is a single fact that is either true or false.  But this says nothing 
of the transitive meanings that come from the person saying the sentence.  The emphasis 
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given to particular words or certain types of intonations could communicate more 
information than just the meanings of the words by themselves.  So, the sentence has a 
substantive factual element; but it has a transitive element that contains the “whole gamut 
of human emotion, of skepticism, wonderment, and every other sentiment” (Stephenson, 
1986, p. 523).  The substantive aspect precludes the transitive aspect, but yet they are 
both contained in the same sentence: this is the nature of complementarity.   
Although containing substantive and transitive elements, the above sentence about 
Columbus exists as a single undivided state.  As Bohr (1950) noted, “any attempt at 
subdividing the phenomena will demand a change in the experimental arrangement, 
introducing new sources of uncontrollable interactions between objects and measuring 
instruments” (p. 52).  This highlights the same issue that was noted between the 
assumptions of mind as an abstraction from the body or as an abstraction from the 
quantum realm.  The different assumptions lead to different methodological 
arrangements.  In the classical set up, the goal is for simple causality and generalized 
predictability about human behavior—it was already noted how unsuccessful this has 
been.  Within the framework of quantum subjectivity, however, psychological events are 
“incompatible with psychological situations where causal analysis is reasonably 
attempted” (Bohr, 1950, p. 54).   
What is at stake within an understanding of complementarity is a rejection of 
explanatory argumentation (Bohr, 1950) of “all methodologies in the classic form, of 
specifying causes, deducing effects, and making predictions in stepwise determinations” 
(Stephenson, 1986).  What is needed, then, is the quantum view of consciousness, i.e. 
subjectivity, which has been argued.  Once it is clearly understood, a tool can be 
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identified to measure it—in this case, the sorting of statements and the treatment of the 
data within Q methodology.  The goal is not to measure the substantive properties of 
thought, but, the transitive properties that involve self-referentiality.  Complementarity 
demonstrates the quantumization of communicability (Stephenson, 1989, p. 15).  
Operationalizing this self-referential communication is the goal, and its measurement will 
be the scientific exploration of subjectivity.   
 To solve the problems with embodied versions of consciousness, quantum theory 
needs to be applied to the communicability of human subjectivity (Stephenson, 1989).   
The need for communicability has been demonstrated in the philosophical and scientific 
foundations of human nature and consciousness.  It was important that a priori categories 
of the mind were dispensed with.  Dispensing of them allows for an unfettered 
psychological investigation into people’s actual perspectives about their own lived 
experiences with only one single “category” being operationalized in the 
experimentation: self-referential, subjective communication (Stephenson, 1989).   
Psychological Events 
Humans, by nature, have a self-awareness that allows them to make choices about 
their own actions.  The true value of conscious self-awareness is that people can 
conceptualize the life they want for themselves in the future, and can choose actions that 
meet these goals.  Consciousness is not a physical entity, but an abstraction from the 
underlying implicate quantum order.  Since it takes the self as its focus, consciousness is 
best understood as subjectivity, which has communicability as its core function.  
Consciousness is not understood by assuming a priori categories of the mind—like those 
proposed in ideas like dual-process theories—but rather it is best understood when it 
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communicates its own self-referential feelings and believes during psychological events.  
The goal of psychological experimentation is the measurement of these events. 
Kantor’s Psychological Events 
Kantor (1959) had factors that served as guides to investigate behavioral 
segments.  In each unique behavioral situation (k), he distinguished between a stimulus 
function (sf) and a response function (sr).  In the system where sf and sr were generated, 
he also specified a the immediate setting (st) and a historical interbehavioral process (hi).  
The medium of interbehavior (md) is also included to account, which often exist as a 
context although not providing direct stimulus on the event.  The psychological event 
(PE) is thus formulated by Kantor (1959) as: 
                         𝑃𝐸 = 𝐶(𝑘, 𝑠𝑓, 𝑠𝑟, ℎ𝑖, 𝑠𝑡, 𝑚𝑑)    (1) 
where C symbolizes that the psychological field consists of the entire system of factors in 
interaction.   
The decision that Julie and Mark made to have sex together can be represented 
this way.  First, the full vignette is as follows: 
Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in France on 
summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near 
the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making 
love. At the very least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was 
already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. 
They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that 




Here, during the decision to make love (k),  they are in a unique setting (st) of being alone 
in a cabin near the beach.  There must be some mitigating factors that precipitated a 
conversation about sex, but without details, the conversation itself serves as a sort of 
stimulus function (sf) which leads to a sexual act (rf).  The medium (md) could be the 
whole special trip through France, which might serve as some sort of romantic force—
different from what might have happened if they were just spending time back at their 
parents’ house.  The historical interbehavioral process (hi) has to do with their views on 
sex and the nature of their relationship together up to this point.  So, all of these things 
interact within the psychological field in question, which lead to the ultimate decision 
that they both made to follow through on their idea.  This all defines the psychological 
event.  Formula (1) shows what needs to be measured to investigate psychological events, 
and will consequently be used again as a methodology becomes more clear.  
Hilbert Spaces 
There is an issue with Kantor’s formulation of psychological events that makes it 
difficult to measure; that is, the empirical space is undefined, except “nominally as a 
place where factors are in interaction” (Stephenson, 1982, p.242).  While the claim that 
mind is an abstraction from the implicate quantum order has not yet been operationally 
useful, it can now do the work of defining this empirical space.  To investigate 
psychological events scientifically, which is the goal of this project, the quantum order 
can define the factor space as the Hilbertian space of mathematics and statistics 
(Stephenson, 1982). 
A Hilbert space is a vector space with an inner product operation (Busemeyer & 
Bruza, 2012) that allows length and angle to be measured.  The inner product operation 
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associates each pair of vectors with a scalar quantity—the inner product of the vectors.  
The inner product between vectors can be zero, and so it can define orthogonality 
between vectors.  The orthogonal vector spaces will be important to later discussion of 
decision making.  What is being proposed is that psychological events can be thought of 
as existing within a Hilbert space.  The subsections below shows what this looks like.  
System state.  Before any psychological event that has a response stimulus, the 
person has a particular prior mental state.  This mental state can be thought to exist as a 
vector with in the Hilbert Space.  This is a unit-length (length 1) state vector  |𝑆⟩ that can 
be projected down onto base vectors.  The projection of the state vector onto a base 
vector is an example of a person moving from an indefinite state to a definite one.  For 
example, if Julie asks Mark if he would like to make love, he would project his belief 
state onto either a subspace for yes or a subspace for no. 
In thinking about measuring psychological events, this type of projection is 
important.  The answers that come out of quantum systems are constructed from the 
interaction between an indefinite belief state and the question being asked (Bohr, 1958; 
Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012).  This is understood by thinking of judgments creating mental 
states rather than describing them (Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012).  When Mark decided that 
he wanted to make love to Julie, he created his belief at the time of his decision.  That is 
to say, he was not walking around holding a permanent and definitive belief about 
making love to Julie inside of his mind at all times.  When the question is asked, though, 
Mark can take into account all of the factors present at the time of a psychological event 
to make up his mind.  When he does, he projects his mental state onto the belief state 
about sex with Julie. 
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The Hilbert vector space is spanned by an orthonomal set of basis vectors 𝑉 =
{ |𝑉𝑖⟩, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁} that form the basis for the space (Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012).  A 
psychological event, PE, is a subspace spanned by a subset 𝑉𝑃𝐸  ⊆ V of basis vectors, and 
the event corresponds to a projector 𝐏𝑃𝐸 =  ∑  |𝑉𝑖⟩⟨ 𝑉𝑖|𝑖 ∈𝑃𝐸 . In the Julie asking Mark 
about making love example, Mark does not yet know that he will be asked about this, and 
so his mental state |𝑆⟩ is neutral to the question.  When the concept of sex is introduced, 
Mark focuses on the vector space that contains his knowledge and beliefs about making 
love to Julie: 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑣𝑒 = { |𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑖⟩, 𝑖 = 1, 𝑁}. Within this feature space are the two 
possible answers to the question: yes and no.  The subset for yes is spanned by the subset 
𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑦𝑒𝑠 ⊂  𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑣𝑒 = { |𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑖⟩, 𝑖 = 1, 𝑁} of the base vectors, and the 
answer no to the sex question is spanned by the orthogonal complement (Busemeyer & 
Bruza, 2012).   
State revision.  When Mark decides that it would be interesting and fun to make 
love to Julie, he projects his belief state onto the vector space for the yes.  This updates 




 (Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012).  This equation ensures that the belief projects 
remains at unit length, and the revised state can be used to calculate probabilities of 
future projections (Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012). 
Probability. This quantum way of thinking about belief projection has as its start 
the state vector  |𝑆⟩.  For probability postulates, the probability of a psychological event 
PE spanned by 𝑉𝑃𝐸  ⊆ V is defined by 𝑞𝑣(𝑃𝐸) =  ‖𝐏𝑃𝐸  |𝑆⟩‖
2.  In the Mark example, the 




 |𝑆⟩   
No 
vectors onto this subspace, and a project for the complement, which is 𝐏𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑣𝑒̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝐈 −
 𝐏𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑣𝑒 where I is the identity operator that projects on the entire Hilbert space 
(Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012).  In this model, a person first “projects his belief state vector 
down onto the subspace for that response to the question, and the probability equals the 
square length of this projection” (Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012).  Specifically, the 
probability of the Mark saying yes to Julie is found by projecting his belief state |𝑆⟩ onto 
the subspace for yes, which produces the projection  𝐏𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑣𝑒|𝑆⟩, and then the 
probability of sayings yes equals the squared length.  The probability of decisions can be 
calculated with specific values.  Calculating specific probabilities is not important here, 
but the concept of probabilities is important and will be used in a distinct way from the 
idea of prediction. 
Quantum Decision Making 
Figure 1. 
 
Representation of yes/no belief projections in Hilbert space 
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 Mark deciding that he does want to make love to Julie can be seen as a straight 
forward decision.  This can be represented on a two-dimensional Hilbert space where 
Mark’s state vector is represented by the vector |𝑆⟩ which spans the space between 
possible responses before he makes a decision.  The two-dimensional space does not 
represent all of Mark’s mental activity; rather, it shows the decision space that he now 
focuses on when asked about love making.  This space has the possibilities of yes and no 
represented by orthogonal rays, which are the mutually exclusive decision subspaces for 
his response.  In the Julie and Mark story, Mark and Julie decide to follow through on 
making love, and so both of their decisions can be shown by the projection of the state 
vector onto the vector that spans the ray for the yes belief.   
Single Belief Projections 
 The above diagram shows a very simple projection to a belief state from a 
previously uncommitted position.  Taking this decision in isolation, one can wonder 
about the types of feelings, believes, desires, and commitments that operate within the yes 
and no subspaces.  For example, the vignette says that Julie and Mark think that it would 
be “interesting and fun” to make love.  Therefore, these concepts help inform the yes 
space.  The vignette also states that making love makes them feel closer to each other, 
and so concepts like connection and unity (or broadly, relational concerns) might also 
define this space. In the story, Julie and Mark express a concern for pregnancy and other 
people finding out, and so these might be the concerns that inform the subset for no to the 
same question.  The internal mental projection to the yes subset for Julie and Mark 
resulted in a concrete physical activity.  One way of measuring Julie and Mark’s 
perspectives on incest would be to record their behaviors.  In this case, Julie and Mark 
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did have sex and so the presence of the behavior is a good indicator of which believe 
space they projected on to.  The behavior alone does not give an indication of reasons 
why they might hold these believes, if they always hold these believes, or if they will 
continue to hold these believes in the future. 
Without any context, the decision situation can be described relatively simply.  
For each mutually exclusive option—yes or no—there are base vectors which contain 
certain patterns and concepts.  It could be possible to put concepts like interesting, fun, 
pleasurable in the yes subspace and concepts like fear of pregnancy or fear that others 
might find out in the no subspace.  There might be a number of shared features as well, 
but the distinguishing features work to separate the two options.   
In experiments involving this vignette, such as described in Haidt et al. (2000), 
participants are given the story and asked what they think about this and whether or not 
they did something wrong.  This set up mimics the structure of the above decision, just 
from a third person point of view.  Here, participants make a similar yes or no projection.  
This time, the frame of reference is not necessarily about Julie and Mark, but what the 
research participant thinks about the situation.  Consequently, a participant might include 
aspects of Julie’s or Mark’s perspectives into consideration; but the features of the 
subspaces for yes and no will otherwise be defined by his own belief about sex, incest, 
etc.  When asked if Julie and Mark did something wrong, most participants projected 
their belief state onto the vector space for yes, but when asked to explain why, many 
participants had a difficult time Haidt et al. (2000).  Essentially, to answer this type of 
question, participants would have to articulate the features of the subspace for the yes 
projection.  Since this was difficult for the participants, the researchers concluded that 
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moral dumbfounding had occurred and that intuition drove the decision.  The argument 
here is that this is not the case.  Essentially, the features of the subspace are difficult to 
articulate but they exist nonetheless.  The projection onto a yes or no space might have 
more to do with knowing through connaturality.  This is different than intuition, but is a 
difficult type of knowledge to articulate.  Figuring out how to articulate the features of 
the subspace are important to a scientific exploration of people’s viewpoints on the 
matter.  The issue gets more complex, though, before this can happen. 
Multiple Belief Projections 
  The simple two-dimensional model of the belief projection is an easy way to 
conceptualize of a single judgment.  It is far too simple, though, to think that the decision 
that Julie and Mark made to have sex was the result of a single decision.  The story 
simply says that “they decided” (Haidt, 2001, p. 1024) without offering any details.  
Perhaps this was the result of a long conversation.  Regardless of the specific mechanism, 
though, the decision most likely played out as the final decision in a subsequent line of 
previous decisions.  Looking back at Kantor’s formulation of a psychological event is a 
good reminder of the multi ingredients at play: 𝑃𝐸 = 𝐶(𝑘, 𝑠𝑓, 𝑠𝑟, ℎ𝑖, 𝑠𝑡, 𝑚𝑑).  A simple 
stimulus function (perhaps the final argument offered to each other in the discussion) 
resulted in a simple stimulus response (deciding to make love), but the psychological 
event also included a historical behavioral relationship, the unique setting of their action, 
and other mediating factors.   
In the story, Julie and Mark are traveling in France together and find themselves 
alone in a cabin near the beach.  Even if they have been to France together before, this is 
a trip away from their normal habitats and so offers a new context.  France itself might 
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serve as a medium of interbehavior (md).  Stephenson (1982) offers an appropriate 
example of this when he notes that darkness is not an active stimulus is starting a sexual 
act, but it can serves as a relevant medium in the behavior.  Likewise, there is something 
particular romantic about France and this might have influenced a number of decisions 
leading up to that point.  
Why is this important?  It is important because the totality of the psychological 
event leading up to the final decision to make love is much more complex than what is 
explained by the simple projection model above.  Julie and Mark most likely made a 
number of decisions leading up to the sexual act.  For example, Mark might have decided 
that he did feel in a romantic mood on the trip and might have made a gesture to put his 
arm around Julie during a visit to the Eiffel Tower.  This is purely speculative, but if he 
did make such a decision, it might have led to a series of other instances of physical 
contact which could have facilitated the final act.  If the decision to make love came as a 
result of other prior decisions, then there are a number of items that need to be addressed 
to understand the final decision.    
Uncertainty and Incompatibility.  In the quantum model, judgments create rather than 
describe belief states.  This does not mean that the answer to every question requires the 
creation of a new belief state.  Busemeyer and Bruza (2012) note that for many questions, 
there is a “stored answer that is simply retrieved on demand (e.g., Have you ever read a 
certain book?)” (p. 3).  But for more complex ones like the decision to make love to a 
sibling, one would have to create an answer “from [one’s] current state and context” 
which requires “constructing a reality from the interaction between the person’s 




 |𝑆⟩.   
Mark No 
Mark thinks Julie Yes 
Mark Thinks Julie No 
Kantor’s (1959) formulation of a psychological event by taking into account the structure 
and situation of the decision.  It also has implications about how creations of belief state 
impacts subsequent decisions.   
When Mark projected his belief state onto the vector space for yes to making love, 
it required an update to his state vector.  In this case, it was the change of the 
uncommitted belief state  |𝑆⟩ to the updated state  |𝑆𝑗𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑣𝑒⟩ =  
𝐏𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑣𝑒  |𝑆⟩
‖𝐏𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝐿𝑜𝑣𝑒  |𝑆⟩‖
 . This 
gives Mark a new starting point for subsequent decisions.  If Julie asks Mark if he would 
like to make love and he projects into the above space, then his starting belief vector is in 
a new position.  If she asks a follow up question of any sort, Mark would rotate onto the 
new believe from his projected state and not from his original  |𝑆⟩ position.   
Figure 2. 
 
Representation of a possible belief decision for Mark in Hilbert space 
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The first question sets up a “context that changes the answer to the next question” 
(Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012, p. 4); this has implications for determining the probability of 
Mark’s responses since a joint probability cannot be defined between the two questions.  
Rather, a probability can only be assigned to the sequence of answers to the first question 
followed by the second question.   
If the two questions require projections onto two different orthogonal subspaces, 
the questions are incompatible with each other.  Asking Mark what he feels about making 
love to Julie is a simple projection to his belief state.  If he is asked about Julie’s 
perspective on the same topic first, he can project a belief about what Julie thinks.  If 
subsequently asked about his own perspective after having updated his belief state to 
account for what he thinks is Julie’s belief, he would be moving to his new projection 
from the starting point of his updated state which accounts for Julie’s belief.  Thinking 
about Julie’s perspective first creates uncertainty in his own perspectives.  As Busemeyer 
and Bruza (2012) note, “it may be impossible to be in a definite state with respect to two 
different questions, because a definite state…for one is an indefinite state…for another” 
(p. 4).  When events are incompatible like this, the order they are asked impacts 
judgments—this is the non-commutative nature of the quantum model.   
Reframing the Julie and Mark Vignette 
The sequence of decision making above can be represented again in a two-
dimensional Hilbert Space.  If Mark is starting to think about his desire to make love to 
Julie but does not yet have adequate information about Julie’s perspective to know 
exactly how she is thinking, then the two decisions are not inherently compatible with 
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each other.  In this case, he would make making projections to two different sets of base 
vectors. 
In chart representing these two projections, it would be psychologically difficult 
for Mark to project to a belief that he would want to make love to Julie.  However, if 
comes to the belief that Julie would like to make love to him, it becomes easier for him to 
think about it himself.  The order of these projections becomes explicitly relevant.  If this 
chart was expanded to account for a number of other prior decisions, the above idea of 
uncertainty becomes clearer and the complexity of the situation is more visible.  Thinking 
about the decision that Mark made about sex with Julie as a single judgment projection 
neglects the other aspects of a psychological event.  
For example, Julie and Mark could have considered the relational, physical, 
cultural, and moral issues relating to them making love.  The decision can be seen as an 
inference situation involving the above variables as causal variables that independently 
influence the effect of how one thinks about what Julie and Mark did.  This effect, E, can 
represent the question: will we make love? In this way, the effect variable along with the 
causal variables are binary and can be represented in a simple two-dimensional Hilbert 
space (see Figure 1) as vectors.  The answer to the question effect question has two 
vector spaces: yes they will make love (E1) and no they will not make love (E2).  
Likewise, if Julie and Mark considered the relational, physical, cultural, and moral issues; 
these can be considered as similar base vectors.  That is, there are yes and no vector 
spaces for whether or not they are attending to appropriate relational, physical, cultural, 
and moral concerns or not.   
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Since Julie and Mark have never made love before, they do not have a fully 
integrated mental model by which they can combine all of these variables in a compatible 
way.  That is, they do not have a simple mechanism by which to consider all of the 
relevant variables together in a simple combined probability space.  As such, thinking 
about each of these issues impacts how they think about the final decision.  The order of 
how they think about these things impacts the overall decision as well.  This forms part of 
the definition of an incompatible event discussed above.  The quantum model is 
important here since each of the variables in the inferential task are incompatible with 
each other: that is, thinking about one creates uncertainty about the others.  
Suppose Julie and Mark consider two casual variables, i.e. relationship and 
cultural norms.  These variables X and Y are considered in their impact on the decision to 
make love, represented as the effect E.  In thinking about their relationship, they might 
think about growing closer (X1) or about hurting their relationship (X2).  For cultural 
norms, they might consider what is culturally permissible (Y1) and what is taboo (Y2).  
This model has three pairs of bases for the decision space corresponding to the three 
variables X, Y, and E: { |𝑋1⟩  |𝑋2⟩ }, { |𝑌1⟩  |𝑌2⟩ }, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 { |𝐸1⟩  |𝐸2⟩ }.  Similarly, these 
would be expanded out for all other causal variables (such as physical and moral 
concerns) that are considered in this decision event (Trueblood et al., 2017).   
Since thinking about each of these variables is incompatible with the others—that 
is, thinking about one causes uncertainty in another—then the order of projection is 
important.  If Julie and Mark think about having sex, E1, before they think about the 
relational implications; the outcome has a different probability than thinking about these 
items in the reverse order.  A simple model such as this represents a quantum model 
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described in Trueblood et al. (2017).  This model accounts for two unique features in 
addition to accounting for order effects.  These are reciprocity and memorylessness.  
Reciprocity refers to Julie and Mark judging that the probability of a variable given 
another is the same as the reverse.  For example, they might judge that the probability of 
relationship improvement given cultural permissibility is the same as the probability for 
cultural permissibility given relationship improvement.  This phenomenon is linked to the 
inverse fallacy and could lead Julie and Mark to equate posterior and likelihood 
possibilities (Trueblood et al., 2017).  In the example about relationship and culture, it is 
easy to see that the probability that a relationship improves given cultural permissibility 
might not carry the same probability of something being culturally permissible if it 
improves a relationship.  Secondarily, the model shows that when there are three or more 
incompatible events (such as X, Y, and E), the conditional probability for two or more of 
those events demonstrates memorylessness.  That is, the probability of an event E given X 
and Y only relies on the most recent information provided.  So the probability of an event 
E given X then Y is the same is the probability of an event E given just Y.  If Julie and 
Mark think about having sex given that they understand that it is culturally taboo, but 
then that they think it would bring them closer together; the probability of having sex is 
the same as if they had never thought about it being culturally taboo.    
The Post-Facto Observer  
If Julie and Mark thought about all variables (such as the relational, physical, 
cultural, and moral issues about making love), it shows how the decision becomes 
complicated.  What if a third-person observer is to make a judgment about what they did?  
When Julie and Mark were in the moment, their decision projections about the issues 
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were part of an inferential task of determining whether or not they would make love from 
the available information and perspective available to them.  In observing the event post 
facto, one already knows the conclusion—they did make love.  In this case, the observer 
is making a judgment about what they did.  As a simple binary choice, the observer 
would project to yes they did something wrong or no they did not do something wrong.  
Is represented identically to the situation where Mark decided if he wanted to make love 
or not.  Here (see Figure 1), the yes projection represents that the observer thinks Julie 
and Mark did something wrong.  It would also be possible to add the causal variables of 
relational, physical, cultural, and moral perspectives.   
At this point, the exploration of projections has been to binary, mutually exclusive 
spaces (yes and no).  This says nothing about the features of these subspaces, though, and 
therefor has limited information to communicate.  This is essentially the issue in the 
Haidt (2001) study where participants could determine location of their state (that it 
projected to yes or no), but could say very little at all about the features of the subspace.  
The explanation that intuition made the decision is less tenable if particular casual 
variables are identified.  In this simple case, the decision to say that Julie and Mark did 
something wrong is an effect that is caused by projecting beliefs about the causal 
variables in question.  That is to say that someone who thinks Julie and Mark did 
something wrong thinks that way because he believes there are issues regarding the 
relational, physical, cultural, and moral aspects of the action. 
What more can be said?  Certainly, these individual variables incorporate very 
complex and robust concepts.  In thinking about Julie and Mark, one can make a number 
of claims regarding the morality of making love than simply if it was a good or bad thing 
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to do.  From this very basic delineation of the decision task, it is easy to see how features 
of the “yes they did something wrong” and the “not they did not do something wrong” 
subspaces exist.  At this point, these are things like the casual variables in the inferential 
task above, i.e. things like relational, physical, cultural, and moral concerns.  These 
features are not yet robust enough to fight off a claim of moral dumbfounding.  In the 
Haidt (2001), he describes how in prior research with the vignette, researchers pushed 
back against simple claims like these by showing how the story already accounted for 
them.  For example, if someone said Julie and Mark did something wrong because it 
would hurt their relationship and she might get pregnant; they were reminded that the 
story said it brought them closer together and that they used protection.  These simple 
statements and retorts are not enough to undervalue the entire concept of relational and 
physical concerns, though.  What is needed is a fuller articulation of subspace features to 
paint a clearer picture of someone’s viewpoint about the action.    
Summary 
 Individual human actions can represent mistakes and miscalculations, and so the 
totality of the self-reflective moral life is the true value of the human experience.  The 
moral psychology of humans requires the study of the psychological events of actual 
people living out their lives.  The human mind is an abstraction of the same quantum 
phenomena that makes the physical universe possible (Marshall, 1989): mind is not an 
abstraction of a bodily function directly.  This means that the mind is more than the total 
of its embodied neurological responses.  Instead, quantum theory and mind have the same 
common quality: the enfolded implicate order of the undivided universe (Pylkkänen, 
2004).  The implicate order takes as its most basic nature that of movement.  This 
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movement is a type of active information that enfolds and unfolds the universe in a 
constant process (Bohm and Hiley, 1993).  The human mind moves in this way as well.  
That mind extends beyond the explicate order of the physical body does not predicate any 
inherent transcendental implications necessarily.  The mind as part of the implicate order 
is a matter of quantum theory and of the works of the physical universe—it is the proper 
application of modern science to the concept of mind.  Knowledge that pierces to the 
heart of human nature represents knowing connaturally, which is a phenomena distinct 
from intuition, but which is also difficult to put into words.   
 The aspect of mind that is non-essential and non-measureable is the consciousness 
as a thing itself.  The essential aspect of mind is its ability to share knowledge, which 
associates with a context that shapes the lived experience of those in a particular context 
(Watts & Stenner, 2003).  What consciousness can communicate is the internal life of a 
person that is uniquely filtered through a fully self-referential perspective.   This is 
consciousness as subjectivity and it has as its most basic quality that of communicability 
(Stephenson, 1989).  Simple statements that people make have very basic substantive, 
factual meanings.  The fullness of human communication, though, captures the transitive 
flow of the subjective enfolding and unfolding of meaning.  The true richness of self-
referential subjective communication is the phenomena of the mind that needs to be 
measured.   
 This quantum model of communicability allows the field in which a 
psychological event takes place to be defined within a Hilbert space.  This helps provide 
a mathematical representation of belief projections within the space.  Quantum theory 
applies to this type of psychological event, and it can be measured with a Q methodology 
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study which operates with the same principles.  In the quantum model, the belief 
decisions are visualized as projections to vector spaces.  These vector spaces have 
defining features that describe them.  Although previous research with the Julie and Mark 
vignette have been unable to define the features of these subspaces, this chapter set up the 














The specific purpose of this study was to identify empirically stable viewpoints 
that expert participants might have about what Julie and Mark did.  These viewpoints are 
identified through Q methodology and its method of extracting factors and are defined in 
Chapter IV.  The interpretation of factor arrays were used to define the features of the 
belief subspaces relating to the Julie and Mark vignette.  The study approaches the Julie 
and Mark issue in a similar way that previous studies have done.  That is, participants 
were given the vignette and were asked to consider various ways to think about it.  What 
will be unique is that a Q methodology study will be performed so that participants can 
demonstrate their viewpoint from their own perspective and the perspectives of others in 
a way that specifically articulates well-defined believes about the issue.  To do this, the 
study used a small group of participants who reviewed the Julie and Mark issue from a 
number of self-referential perspectives.  This was done by sorting statements about the 
story on a distribution board that range from statements to which one most disagree to 
those they most agree from either their direct perspective or from their conceptualization 




 In this chapter, a specific methodology is described that builds on the concept of 
communicability outlined in the previous chapter.  First, Methodological Foundations 
helps move from theory to practice by showing how the Interaction of Variables in 
decision making can help by Adding Statements to the experiment that participants can 
use in describing viewpoints.  Q Methodology is defined and its application to the 
present study is detailed.  This includes the Instrument Development with a discussion 
of Concourse.  The Procedure used in this study will show how the selection of 
Participants was made.  Understanding the Data Analysis will lead to a description of 
findings in the next chapter. 
Methodological Foundations 
In this section, a few concepts will be addressed to bridge the theoretical 
discussion from the literature review to the operationalized methodology that is 
implemented.  Within the idea of a psychological event, there is the presence of k which 
is the unique field in which the event operates.  Essentially, this can relate to the 
particular person under investigation and the uniqueness of the self-referential 
perspective that he brings.  Since this investigation requires forced interaction—both 
between previously separated causal variables and between hypothesized perspectives 
and the individual participant—there is a level of noise (or error) introduced into the 
system (Trueblood et al. 2017).  In asking someone about Julie and Mark, he might be 
asked to consider a number of things that could be said.  In the previous section, the 
variables of relationship, physical impacts, cultural norms, and morality were introduced.  
But these are not the only variables in consideration.  The uniqueness of the situation of 
each psychological event, represented as k, comes to bear on the event itself.  Perhaps this 
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is the unique viewpoint of the person performing the psychological task.  In that case, it is 
hard to isolate the event to only the variables under consideration.  K becomes a form of 
noise which might have an impact on the event.  For example, prior knowledge or 
experience might form a higher dimensional space around the variables.  
Thinking about this type of noise operating within the quantum model outlined 
above changes the nature of the model in a few ways.  The error operates as a free 
parameter since it is dependent on the particulars of each situation. The existence of this 
error operator still maintains the total incompatibility of each event within the system, but 
it takes away the special conditions of reciprocity and memorylessness defined above 
(Trueblood et al. 2017).   
Interaction of Variables 
 In a simple quantum model, judgments about multiple variables are made by 
considering each variable sequentially (Trueblood, Yearsley, & Pothos, 2017).  When 
thinking about what Julie and Mark did, a number of variables are interacting together to 
make a judgement.  This increases the complexity by adding higher dimensional 
subspaces (represented as Positive Operator Valued Measures rather than projection 
operators, see Nielsen and Chuang, 2000).  The casual variables are things like the 
relational and cultural questions that would impact the effect.  For measurement, these 
variables are not considered one by one, but in interaction together.  The variables in this 
experiment are represented by statements which are used together by a participant to 






 A sampling of all the statements that someone could say about the Julie and Mark 
vignette creates a set of representative statements considered the concourse of 
communicability (Brown, 1980). These statements can be sorted by a participant to 
explain a viewpoint about what they did, or even to represent viewpoints from other 
people’s perspectives.  In Q methodology, a Q sort is operationalized by the self-
referential viewpoint of a participant under a condition of instruction (such as, what do 
you think about what Julie and Mark did?).  Experimentally, the psychological event 
formula is updated to account for the methodological procedure such that: 
                         𝑃𝐸 = 𝐶(𝑘, 𝑄 − 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 1, 2, … , 𝑛)    (2) 
where C “symbolizes Q sort conditions in interaction in a unique situation k” 
(Stephenson, 1982).  These sorts are factored and formalized as: 
                         𝑃𝐸 = 𝐶(𝑘, 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 1, 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 2, … , 𝑛)   (3) 
Quantum theory applies to formula (3) where “cause-and-effect postulates in the classical 
style are not involved, where categorical constraints are eliminated, and where standard 
(not an absolutist) statistical unit of scores applies” to all of the Q sorts for all people in 
all cultures with a zero at the point of no feeling (Stephenson, 1982).  The factors are 
viewpoints with a fully articulated array of statements that form the features of the belief 
space.  In the quantum model, k—which signifies the uniqueness of the situation in which 
the psychological event operates—can be represented as an error term 𝜀 which represents 
the extent that this uniqueness can influence the other variables in question.  One way of 
thinking about 𝜀 is as “a measure of the number of other events that can either cause, or 
be caused by, both the event and its negation” (Trueblood et al., p. 16).  This helps 
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explain how even when participants are attempting to explain viewpoints from different 
perspectives, their own self-referential viewpoints interact with the variables.  Performing 
Q sorts from different perspectives produces viewpoints that still communicate the self-
referential subjectivity of the participant. 
Q Methodology 
 The methodological structure under consideration is that of Q methodology.  Q 
methodology was proposed by William Stephenson in a letter to the journal Nature in 
1935.  As a student of Charles Spearman, Stephenson was familiar with the formulation 
of factor analysis which is concerned with a selected population of n individuals each of 
whom has been measured in m tests: and the “(m)(m-1)/2 intercorrelations for these m 
variables are subject to either a Spearman or other factor analysis” (Stephenson, 1935, p. 
297).  The technique proposed by Stephenson inverted this practices such that a 
population of n tests are measured or scaled by m individuals.  The (m)(m-1)/2 
intercorrelations are then factorized according to the same procedures as above 
(Stephenson, 1935).   In grouping individuals, the factors represent stabilized viewpoints 
that these people hold.    
Instrument Development 
 The sorting is performed on a Q set of statements that represent possible 
statements about Julie and Mark’s behavior.  The most important aspect of the sampling 
procedure for the study was the combination of the four original causes that have been 
discussed (relational, physical, cultural, and moral concerns) into a single space where 
they interact together.  Here the four causal variables retain their binary projection 
possibilities as interbehavioral consequences (effects).  Also, a number of neutral 
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judgement statements are included so that participants are able to articulate viewpoints 
beyond the simple dichotomy.  This is easy to see in a type of Fisherian block design 
(Stephenson, 1993).  Now, the purpose is not simply to measure which projections are 
made.  Rather, the goal is to say something about the features of these spaces.  To do this, 
one must consider all of the possible things one might say regarding Julie and Mark 
making love.   
Figure 3 
 
Fisherian block design example 
 
CAUSES EFFECTS 
   
A. Relational Connective destructive  
 (a) (b) 
B. Physical Safe Risky 
 (c)  (d) 
C. Cultural Permissible Taboo 
 (e) (f) 
D. Moral Good Bad 
 (g) (h) 
 
From all possible statements, a sample of 41 representative statements can be 
taken.  Take for instance, a general statement about a sexual relationship such as: a 
husband and wife regularly have sex. For those with a relatively non-pessimistic view on 
marriage, the effects (a), (c), (e), and (g) might apply.  This might lead one to have a 
relatively positive view of such a statement.  If someone were to arrange a set of 
statements on an array from -5 to 5, this statement might have a positive value of a 4 or 5.  
For the same person, a statement about Julie and Mark having sex might register with 
effects (b), (d), (f), and (h) and be placed as a -4 or -5.   
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 The specific association with the statements to their cause and effects is not 
important from a measurement standpoint.  Rather, the statements interact with each 
other through the engagement by a participant reading them.  In an experimental study, 
participants can be provided with a number of statements to interact with.  The statements 
are derived from all statements that one can make about Julie and Mark as it relates to the 
causal variables under investigation and their effects.  In a case of 41 statements, one can 
be asked to sort them as follows: 
Figure 4 
        
Sort Distribution 
        
 Most Unlike      Most Like 
            
Score -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Frequency 2 3 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 3 2 
 
The result is of each Q-sort is an array of statements that function as a singular whole. It 
has the qualities of the effects of the individual causal variables but it now contains 
descriptive statements that go along with it.  The scoring is forced for theoretical reasons: 
“it should be compared to a physicist’s action when he puts a certain voltage charge 
through an electrical circuit” (Stephenson, 1993, p. 10).  That is, there is a theoretical 
value in forcing the distribution, for including a zero point, and for limiting the number of 
high value representations.   
Concourse 
A concourse is a collection of statements from which a Q set can be sampled.  
The total and exhaustive list of all things that can be said about a topic is a concourse.  
For example, Stephenson (1993) says that in a particular collection of quotes, there were 
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several hundred about old age.  A “collection of self-referent statements about a 
behavioral segment provides the population or universe” (Stephenson, 1982, p. 239) of 
things to be said about an issue under investigation: these collections are concourses.  
Each of these concourses is relatively infinite and continuously expandable, but each 
statement included within a concourse are a matter of common knowledge.  In creating a 
Q set of statements from a concourse, the goal is to sample a representative group of 
statements that explore the totality of the concourse.  In the case of Julie and Mark, 
selecting items from the concourse of all things to be said was done with a theoretical 
sampling choosing representative statements from relational, physical, cultural, and moral 
concerns. This sampling procedure had permissibility, impermissibility, and neutral 
judgments in mind.  The Q set does not need to be ideal in the sense that it becomes the 
defining tool for all future experimentation on the issue.  In fact, any number of Q-sets 
could be created from the concourse of things to be said for future studies.  For this study, 
a Q set of 41 statements was developed and was used by each participant under each of 
the ten conditions of instruction.  The full list of statements and the conditions of 
instruction is included Table 1.   
Table 1 
 
Conditions of instruction 
  
1 What do you think about what Julie and Mark did? 
2 What was Julie thinking? 
3 What would Julie and Mark’s parents think about this? 
4 What would you have thought about this situation when you were in college? 
5 What might a person you look up to think about this? 
6 What was Mark thinking? 
7 What might someone who supports Julie and Mark’s decision think about what they 
did? 
8 What does the most impulsive side of you think about this? 
9 What do you think about this from a purely practical perspective? 
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10 What do you think about what Julie and Mark did? 
 
Procedures 
 When participants read the Julie and Mark vignette, they can think about what 
took place.  Each condition of instruction is a perspective that can be analyzed to form 
generalized viewpoints about the vignette.  To determine the features of these viewpoints, 
Q method was used to analyze the sorts.  In this case, 41 statements representing four 
casual variables and their binary effects (with the addition of some neutral statements) 
were given to a participant to sort on a normalized distribution.  Each Q-sort produces a 
single array of statements such that: 
                         𝑃𝐸 = 𝐶(𝑘, 𝑄 − 𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡 1, 2, … , 𝑛)    (2) 
These sorts are factored according to Q method to result in the stabilized perspectives 
regarding the Julie and Mark vignette.  Each sort had a condition of instruction prompting 
the participant to think about the issue from a particular perspective.  Each participant 
performed the ten Q sorts using the same Q set of statements.  The conditions of 
instruction explore the issue from a number of different perspectives that are all self-
referential to the sorter.  
Participants 
 This study used a small group of four expert participants.  Q Methodology does 
not generalize about populations of people, and so the selection of participants does not 
require sampling theory.  Rather, the goal is that participants would be able to carefully 
and thoughtfully perform the Q sorts under each condition of instruction.  As such, the 
selection of participants was done from those who have strongly considered issues of 
ethics and morality.  Each of the four expert participants in this study had either taken or 
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taught graduate level courses in moral psychology or philosophy or has graduate 
education and experience in a field that utilizes highly specialized practical ethical 
considerations.  All participants had advanced degrees in their field and the researcher 
served as a participant. 
Data Analysis 
 The study involved four participants performing a Q sort under ten conditions of 
instruction.  This provided 40 total sorts which were analyzed using an N X N correlation 
matrix.  Thus, despite the small number of participants, there was a large number of data 
points to be analyzed.  The data are the resulting z-scores that make possible the direct 
comparisons with scores for the same statements in all resulting factors (Brown, 1980).  
The sorts are factor analyzed to group like-minded viewpoints together.  The stabilized 
factors emerged as unique belief spaces regarding the Julie and Mark issue.  The 
interpretation of the factor arrays address the first research question by providing 
mathematically stable and qualitatively interpreted viewpoints represented by the 
generalized arrays of the z-scores of the statements.  The number of stable factors was 
determined by the data, and so informed the question about which viewpoints exist.   
 Once the factors emerge, they were constructed by physically creating posters of 
the boards with the statements in their correct relative places.  These posters were 
analyzed by reviewing the unique array of statements that each of them have.  Through 
an abductive process, familiar to Q methodology, each factor was named and interpreted.  
This process leads to a narrative descriptor of each factor that can be explained by using 
the statements and concepts that define its unique perspective in contrast to the other 
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factors.  These descriptions was compared across conditions of instruction to address the 
second research question.   
 Once these viewpoints were named and defined, were used to demonstrate how 
the findings relate to belief projections in Hilbert space.  In the basic quantum model, 
there are two orthogonal options, these are yes Julie and Mark did something wrong or no 
Julie and Mark did not do something wrong.  By taking into consideration that the self-
referential subjectivity of the participant interacts with the variables under consideration, 
the resulting viewpoints are not explicitly orthogonal.  Removing the requirement of 
orthogonal projections allows the emerging factors to move beyond the simple yes/no 
dichotomy.  The relationship of the viewpoints to the simple projections in Hilbert space 
was determined in response to the third research question to see how the robust 











The purpose of this research was to investigate the complex beliefs that expert 
participants might hold regarding the Julie and Mark story. The intention was to discover 
viewpoints that go beyond the yes they did something wrong, no they did not do 
something wrong dichotomy.   Using Q methodology, participants operationalized 
various viewpoints about the Julie and Mark vignette, which were articulated by sorting 
statements multiple times according to a prescribed list of perspectives.  The viewpoints 
that emerged define the features of beliefs in a way that is complex and highly 
descriptive.  The data provide explanations of beliefs that go beyond the simple yes/no 
dichotomy, but which can nevertheless provide the features of those belief subspaces 
when represented as belief projections in Hilbert space.  The following research questions 
were addressed by the study procedures: 
1)  What are the viewpoints that expert participants might express about the Julie 
and Mark vignette? 
2)  How do these viewpoints differ across multiple perspectives, which are sorted 
as various condition of instruction? 
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3)  How do these viewpoints define the features of belief subspaces represented in 
Hilbert space? 
This chapter presents the results from the factor analysis and the subsequent details of the 
interpretation as analyses for the first research question.  It includes an analysis of how 
the beliefs that sorters defined (viewpoints) differ by condition of instruction 
(perspective) to address the second research question.  The presentation of results and its 
analysis are used to respond to the third research question by showing how the 
viewpoints define the features of subspaces when representing believes as projections in 
Hilbert space.  Each condition of instruction had the sorter consider the issue from his 
perspective and from the perspectives of other people.  The term perspective will be used 
to describe a condition of instruction; the resulting interpretations of factor scores in 
arrays demonstrate the viewpoints associated with different perspectives.   
Data Analysis 
 Q methodology includes three components: the Q sort technique, an associated 
statistical method, and the interpretation of the statistical results (Brown, 1980).  The 
statistical method includes the correlation of all sorts to each other with an N x N 
correlation matrix, a factor analysis and any needed rotations of the correlation matrix, 
and the calculation of z-scores for each statement for each factor.  The result makes it 
possible to compare the common set of statements within each of the resulting factors 
(Brown, 1980).  To analyze the data, the sorts were inputted to the computer program 
PQMethod (Schmolck, 2013).  Each participant created an array of all 41 statements for 
each of the ten conditions of instruction.   These 40 sorts were entered into PQMethod for 
analysis.  After attempting a centroid analysis and various hand rotations, a principal 
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component analysis was used to extract four factors, which was followed by a varimax 
rotation of these four extracted factors.  The significance of factor loadings is calculated 
with the formula for zero-order correlation coefficients (Valenta & Ulrike, 1997), which 
is 𝑆𝐸 =  
1
√𝑁
 where N is the number of Q statements (Brown, 1980). Since there were 41 
statements in this study, the standard error is 𝑆𝐸 =  
1
√41
= .1562.  Correlations or 
loadings of the sort to the factor are considered to be statistically significant at the .01 
level when they exceed at least 2.58 standard errors regardless of sign (Brown, 1980), or 
at .40 which is 2.58(𝑆𝐸) = 2.58(. 1562) =  .40. To reduce the number of confounding 
sorts, the threshold for significance was increased to .60 for this study.  Then, in Q 
methodology, defining sorts are chosen for the final statistical procedure of calculating z-
scores for each statement within each factor. A defining sort has a significant relationship 
to a single factor (see Table 2).   
The four-factor solution with an increased significance was chosen because this 
solution limited the number of confounding sorts (those sorts that defined two or more 
factors) to best stabilize the extracted factors.  Although factors 3 and 4 have only four 
defining sorts, the number is considered stable for interpretation (Brown, 1980).  Table 2 
shows the factor matrix, which is arranged by condition of instruction and sorter (row), 
and factor (column), with an X indicating a defining sort on the factor.   
Table 2.  
 
Factor Matrix with an X Indicating a Defining Sort, and * Denoting 
Exemplar Sort 
 
       
Sort Condition Sorter 1 2 3 4 
*25 2 3 0.8243X -0.1281 -0.1597 -0.1058 
13 6 1 0.7929X -0.3138 -0.2501 0.0751 
21 6 2 0.7815X -0.2722 -0.0933 -0.1359 
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14 7 1 0.7803X -0.3394 -0.1920 0.1723 
37 6 4 0.7763X -0.1827 -0.0854 -0.0453 
39 8 4 0.7747X -0.3101 0.0878 -0.0952 
22 7 2 0.7730X -0.2711 -0.0998 -0.0714 
29 6 3 0.7706X -0.3239 -0.1882 -0.0386 
17 2 2 0.7666X -0.2854 -0.1342 -0.1260 
33 2 4 0.7535X 0.0266 0.0407 -0.1828 
40 9 4 0.7126X -0.1549 0.2258 -0.2092 
38 7 4 0.7068X -0.2862 0.0192 -0.0739 
30 7 3 0.6887X -0.4624 -0.1956 -0.0375 
15 8 1 0.6423X -0.4458 -0.3079 0.2535 
32 9 3 -0.6913X 0.1632 0.4681 0.2017 
11 4 1 -0.6589X 0.4943 0.0117 0.1422 
*31 8 3 0.3015 0.8203X 0.0158 0.0399 
5 1 3 -0.4097 0.8126X 0.0931 0.1320 
7 1 4 -0.5095 0.7684X 0.1738 0.1368 
8 10 4 -0.5196 0.7491X 0.0827 0.1756 
20 5 2 -0.4155 0.7474X 0.2713 0.2430 
3 1 2 -0.4155 0.7474X 0.2713 0.2430 
4 10 2 -0.4155 0.7474X 0.2713 0.2430 
36 5 4 -0.4870 0.7206X 0.1042 0.1671 
6 10 3 -0.5269 0.6901X 0.2520 0.1878 
19 4 2 -0.3674 0.6860X 0.4579 0.2719 
28 5 3 -0.5554 0.6838X 0.1869 0.1737 
27 4 3 -0.4939 0.6740X 0.1270 0.1978 
26 3 3 -0.5223 0.6037X 0.3487 0.1888 
*23 8 2 0.0935 0.1011 0.9106X 0.1407 
24 9 2 0.1182 0.0132 0.9039X 0.1454 
34 3 4 -0.1933 0.2889 0.6935X 0.0305 
35 4 4 -0.2520 0.3620 0.6088X 0.1035 
*12 5 1 -0.0947 -0.0455 -0.0015 0.8990X 
2 10 1 -0.0663 0.3799 0.1926 0.7616X 
16 9 1 -0.0673 0.3026 0.2783 0.7371X 
1 1 1 0.0906 -0.2870 -0.1679 -0.6916X 
18 3 1 -0.3724 0.1388 0.5079 0.3250 
9 2 1 -0.5549 0.3875 0.3408 -0.0527 
10 3 1 0.4892 -0.4522 -0.4251 -0.2758 
Percent of explained variance  
   31 23 11 9 
Number of defining sorts  
   16 13 4 4 
Note: Defining sorts are determined to be at or higher than a correlation of 





 With the solution demonstrated in Table 2, 37 of the 40 sorts defined a single 
factor at or above the .60 value (which was increased from the required minimum value 
of .40).  While the sorts remain important to the solution matrix, three of the sorts did not 
achieve significance on any of the factors at the elevated level, and so were not used to 
define the statement array in the four-factor solution.   
 Within the initial exploration of the extracted factors, factor one had a large 
number of defining sorts with a split between positive and negative correlations.  This 
type of association showed that it was a bipolar factor.  By rotating four factors, most of 
the negative defining sorts were rotated to create a second factor.  In this regard, there is a 
relatively high negative correlation between the factor scores for 1 and 2.  Two 
negatively correlated defining sorts on the first factor show that the inverse viewpoint 
does exist, but that it is distinct from the factor 2.  Table 3 shows the correlation between 
factor scores for the four rotated factors. These are the correlations of the z-scores, not 
the factor loadings. 
Table 3. 
 
   
Correlations between factor scores 
 
 1 2 3 4 
1 1.0000    
2 -.7105 1.0000   
3 -.1436 .3062 1.0000  
4 -.2349 .3863 .2478 1.0000 
 
 Using the same array that participants used to sort the statements under the ten 
conditions of instruction, the statements were arranged for each of the four factors 
according to the order of their associated z-scores.  This produced a full array of the 41 
statements according to their z-scores for each of the four factors.  For each factor array, 
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distinguishing statements were identified.  Distinguishing statements for a factor are 
those whose location in the array differs significantly from its location in the other factor 
arrays.  This comparison is made possible by analyzing the z-scores of the statement for 
each of the factors.  Distinguishing statements are highlighted in bold on the tables 
demonstrating the factor arrays (Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7).  A consensus statement was also 
identified.  This is a statement with similar z-scores across all four of the factors.  The 
consensus statement across factors is: 
Consensus Statement 
       






25 People should feel safe and free 
to have open conversations about 
their sexual desires 
z = .41 z = .84 z = .67 z = 1.10 
 Array Position 0 2 2 3 
 
Each of the viewpoints positively associated this statement with their beliefs.  For 
Individuals in Context, the statement had the highest position in the factor array and 
supported the viewpoint’s idea that people need to determine if a particular action will be 
the right one for them within the broader context of their lives.  The other viewpoints, 
regardless of how they felt about what Julie and Mark did, all accepted that people should 
feel free to have these types of conversations.   
To analyze each viewpoint, statements were placed on boards according to the 
factor array so that each statement was put in place according to its z-score.  This was 
done to create four physical boards with statements arranged in order for that array to be 
visually interpreted.  On each board, the distinguishing statements and consensus 
statements were identified, but all statements were present.  By reviewing all the 
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statements for each of the factor arrays in their proper position, a more comprehensive 
interpretation is possible (Watts & Stenner, 2005; 2012).  This allowed for an analysis 
that considered the placement of distinguishing statements and the placement of other 
statements on the board.  An initial focus was given to the statements on the ends of the 
board: those in the +5, +4, +3, -3, -4, and -5 positions.  Thereafter, all statements were 
considered and comparisons of placement across viewpoints were made.  Evaluating the 
statements in this way allowed themes to emerge that were unique to that factor array.  
These themes, when considered together, helped explain the factor arrays as unique 
viewpoints regarding the Julie and Mark vignette.  The defining themes of each factor 
array were used to give a descriptive name to the factors.  The names demonstrate how 
each viewpoint framed the vignette and were labeled Personal Autonomy, Human 
Nature, Outcomes, and Individuals in Context.  Each of these viewpoints is analyzed 
below by giving specific reference to the statements that support the themes.   
Research Question One: Defining Viewpoints 
The first research question was: What are the viewpoints that expert participants might 
express about the Julie and Mark vignette? 
Personal Autonomy: “It only matters that it’s our decision.” 
 The first factor is defined by 16 of the 40 sorts, and accounts for 31% of the 
variance among the four rotated factors.  Of the 16 defining sorts, two had significant 
negative correlations with the factor; therefore, the inverse of this bipolar factor will be 
briefly described as well.  In thinking about the Julie and Mark vignette, the beliefs that 
this viewpoint describes are focused on the autonomous decisions that people can make 
within their exploration of the moral life.  The major themes are: 1. Julie and Mark can 
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make their own decision, 2. Julie and Mark can decide what is appropriate for their 
relationship, 3. Julie and Mark do not need to worry about what others might think, and 4. 
Julie and Mark’s autonomy is more important than externally imposed expectations.  In 
describing this viewpoint, one participant noted that all external concerns were ignored: 
essentially it amounted in them thinking something like, “It only matters that it’s our 
decision.” 
Table 4 shows the statements that are most like and unlike framing what Julie and 
Mark did through Personal Autonomy.  In the table, the higher the array position and z-
score indicates those statements most like this viewpoint, and a higher negative array 
position and z-score indicates those statements most unlike this viewpoint.   
Table 4.    
 
Most like and most unlike statements for Personal Autonomy 
    




6 Having sex is Julie’s and Mark’s personal choice and not a 
moral concern 
5 1.313 
11 Trying a sexual experience once is different from doing it all of 
the time 
5 1.295 
2 This was an opportunity for Julie and Mark to have a new 
experience together  
4 1.263 
7 Julie and Mark both think sex is fun and interesting 4 1.132 
29 Julie and Mark say sex brought them closer together 4 1.263 
17 Each sexual act needs to be evaluated in context 3 1.029 
26 Some relationships are romantic and sexual, but some are 
just sexual 
3 .920 
5 What Julie and Mark di is OK because they are consenting 
adults 
3 .845 
4 No one will ever find out what Julie and Mark did  3 .752 




30 Making short-term decisions about sex could impact long-
term health and stability 
-3 -
1.214 




36 Sexual morality coms from understanding human nature and the 
purpose of sex 
-3 -
1.408 
19 Julie and Mark are wrong about feeling closer together 
because unity in sex is about long-term connection 
-4 -
1.412 
41  People who have incestuous relationships should not hold some 
jobs or positions within a civil society 
-4 -
1.428 












Note:  Distinguishing statements are in bold. 
Table 4 demonstrates the full array of statements in the -5 to -3 positions and in the 3 to 5 
positions.  The statements in bold in the table are those statements that particularly 
distinguish Personal Autonomy from the other viewpoints.  A distinguishing statement 
shows that the statements in this factor array that are placed in a position distinctly 
different—at a significance of at least p < .05—than the position of the same statement in 
the other factor’s arrays.   
This viewpoint values personal decision-making of the Julie and Mark to make 
their own personal and private decision.  The theme that Julie and Mark can make their 
own decision is supported by the following statements:   
2 This was an opportunity for Julie and Mark to have a new 
experience together 
5 1.295 
7 Julie and Mark both think sex is fun and interesting 4 1.132 
5 What Julie and Mark di is OK because they are consenting 
adults 
3 .845 
8 Julie and Mark are using the college years as a time of sexual 
experimentation 
2 .678 
25 People should feel safe and free to have open conversations 
about their sexual desires 
1 .414 
 
The Personal Autonomy is a viewpoint that gives the people involved the freedom 
to decide what to do for themselves regardless of what others might think.  Julie and 
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Mark are consenting adults who came to a decision together.  In discussing sex, Julie and 
Mark agree that it is fun and interesting and that having sex would be an opportunity to 
have a new experience together.  If they decide to use their college years as a time of 
sexual experimentation in this way; it does not matter if friends, family, or anyone else 
have a different opinion.     
The second theme of Personal Autonomy is that Julie and Mark can decide for 
themselves what impact this might have on their relationship.   
29 Julie and Mark say sex brought them closer together 4 1.263 
9 The sexual secret that Julie and Mark hold can draw them 
closer together 
1 .326 
20 Julie and Mark’s experience could make them more well-
rounded, compassionate, and self-assured people 
1 .378 
19 Julie and Mark are wrong about feeling closer together 
because unity in sex is about long-term connection 
-2 -1.412 




In the vignette, Julie and Mark say that sex brought them closer together.  From this 
viewpoint, this conclusion is accepted.  .   
 In the vignette, Julie and Mark decide not to tell anyone else about what 
happened.  This viewpoint believes that this is true.  Personal Autonomy frames the 
decision as being between Julie and Mark and no one else.  This was seen in the position 
of the following statement within the array: 
4 No one would ever find out about what Julie and Mark did 3 .752 
 
Consequently, what others might think did not influence how their behavior should be 




35 Julie and Mark did something wrong because the culture they live 
in says so 
-1 -.525 




A final theme that emerged is that Julie and Mark’s independence to make their 
own decisions was more important than limiting what they did because of external 
expectations.    
6 Having sex is Julie’s and Mark’s personal choice and not a 
moral concern 
5 1.313 
33 As long as no one gets hurt, there is no such thing as immoral sex 2 .699 
18 There are no universal moral rules about sex 1 .523 
24 Any restrictions on sex are pointless and cruel 0 .408 
16 What Julie and Mark did was wrong because it broke the law -2 -.941 
13 The purpose of sex is for unity and procreation -3 -1.284 
36 Sexual morality comes from understanding human nature and the 
purpose of sex 
-3 -1.408 
41  People who have incestuous relationships should not hold some 
jobs or positions within a civil society 
-4 -1.428 
22 Julie and Mark should only have sex with the people they 
marry 
-4 -1.540 




Since Personal Autonomy accepts that Julie and Mark are consenting adults who have a 
positive response to their decision, external concerns such as the law, morality, and 
conceptualizations of human nature were very unlike the viewpoint.   
Inverse of this Viewpoint. Personal Autonomy is defined by two sorts with a strong 
negative correlation indicating that the inverse of this viewpoint is a distinct, although 
singular, viewpoint.  The inverse of this viewpoint is distinguished from Personal 
Autonomy by being more concerned with what all people ought to do based on external 
standards rather than on what they want to do for themselves.  This is seen from the 
placement of the following statements in the array: 
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15 What Julie and Mark did was wrong because it goes against 
human nature  
5 1.827 
22 Julie and Mark should only have sex with the people they are 
married to 
4 1.540 
36 Sexual morality comes from understanding human nature and 
the purpose of sex 
3 1.408 
 
Human Nature: “Human nature and human dignity is common to all people.” 
The second array is defined by 13 of the 40 sorts and accounts for 23% of the 
variance among the four rotated factors.  In thinking about the Julie and Mark vignette, 
the beliefs that this viewpoint describes are focused on how human nature can inform 
how people work out their moral lives.  The major themes are: 1. a concern for human 
nature and the purpose of sex, 2. a focus on long-term decision making, 3. a generalized 
understanding of sexual relationships, and 4. a belief that consequences should not 
influence Julie and Mark’s decision.  In describing this viewpoint, one participant noted 
that while Julie and Mark are their own people, they are part of the larger essence of 
humanity.  He said, “human nature and human dignity is common to all people.” 
Table 5 shows the statements that are most like and unlike framing what 
happened through a Human Nature.  In the table, the higher the array position and z-score 
indicates those statements most like this viewpoint, and a lower array position and z-
score indicates those statements most unlike this viewpoint.   
Table 5.    
 
Most like and most unlike statements for Human Nature 
    
# Statement Array 
Position 
z-score 
15 What Julie and Mark did was wrong because it goes 
against human nature  
5 1.798 
36 Sexual morality comes from understanding human nature and 




40 Julie and Mark’s friends and family would think differently of 
them if they found out 
4 1.393 
13 The purpose of sex is for unity and procreation  4 1.360 
38 Sex between a brother and a sister destroys the sibling 
relationship 
4 1.322 
30 Making short-term decisions about sex could impact long-
term health and stability  
3 1.295 
19 Julie and Mark are wrong about feeling closer together 
because unity in sex is about long-term connection          
3 1.066 
22 Julie and Mark should only have sex with the people they 
marry 
3 1.063 
31 People should refrain from immediate sexual gratification if it 
could impact their future goals  
3 .930 
14 The purpose of sex is pleasure  -3 -.961 
20 Julie and Mark’s experience could make them more well-
rounded, compassionate, and self-assured people                 
-3 -.990 
34 Abortion and medication could fix any consequences to 
Julie and Mark’s actions  
-3 -1.048 
32 Sexual experiences in the present should not be limited by 
worrying about the future 
-3 -1.248 
9 The sexual secret that Julie and Mark hold can draw them 
closer together  
-4 -1.251 
24 Any restrictions on sex are pointless and cruel  -4 -1.293 
33 As long as no one gets hurt, there is no such thing as immoral 
sex  
-4 -1.545 
6 Having sex is Julie and Mark’s personal choice and not a 
moral concern  
-5 -1.660 
18 There are no universal moral rules about sex  
 
-5 -2.029 
Table 5 demonstrates the full array of statements in the -5 to -3 positions and in the 3 to 5 
positions.  The statements in bold in the table are those statements that particularly 
distinguish Human Nature from the other viewpoints.  A distinguishing statement shows 
that the statements in this factor array that are placed in a position distinctly different—at 
a significance of at least p < .05—than the position of the same statement in the other 
factor’s arrays.   
 This viewpoint focuses on what are viewed as universally applicable expectations 
for people based a concept of human nature.  Human Nature connects expectations of 
people based on human nature with the purpose of sex.  In this viewpoint, the purpose of 
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sex is for creating unity and for procreating in long-term relationships (specifically within 
a marriage).  The ability for consenting adults to make their own decisions does not 
supersede the universal considerations of their nature and the purpose of sex.  This is seen 
in the following statements that correlate with the viewpoint: 
15 What Julie and Mark did was wrong because it goes 
against human nature  
5 1.798 
36 Sexual morality comes from understanding human nature and 
the purpose of sex 
5 1.696 
13 The purpose of sex is for unity and procreation  4 1.360 
22 Julie and Mark should only have sex with the people they are 
married to 
3 1.063 
6 Having sex is Julie and Mark’s personal choice and not a 
moral concern  
-5 -1.660 
17 Each sexual act needs to be evaluated in context -1 -.336 
5 What Julie and Mark did is OK because they are consenting 
adults 
-2 -.961 
18 There are no universal moral rules about sex  
 
-5 -2.029 
 A second theme that is supported by the factor array is a concern for long-term 
decision planning over short-term gratification.  The view of decision making that 
emerges in the Human Nature viewpoint is more concerned more with the future self than 
with the desires of the present self.  It believes that actions in the present might have 
future impacts not immediately seen in the present.  Statements that demonstrate this 
theme are: 
30 Making short-term decisions about sex could impact long-term 
health and stability  
3 1.295 
31 People should refrain from immediate sexual gratification if it 
could impact their future goals  
3 .930 
28 There can be negative consequences to sex other than unwanted 
pregnancy and STIs                    
2 .833 
39 Performing such a taboo sexual act could lead to more risky 
sexual behavior  
2 .782 
32 Sexual experiences in the present should not be limited by 





A third theme supported by the statement positions is that the nature of 
relationships is generalizable: particular situations and circumstances do not change what 
these relationships should be like.  Although Julie and Mark say that their decision 
brought them closer together, a Human Nature does not take this evaluation into 
consideration.  Rather, it articulates a more general view of relationships that applies to 
all people: 
38 Sex between a brother and a sister destroys the sibling 
relationship 
4 1.322 
19 Julie and Mark are wrong about feeling closer together because 
unity in sex is about long-term connection          
3 1.066 
29 Julie and Mark say sex brought them closer together -1 -.262 
26 Some relationships are romantic and sexual, but some are just 
sexual 
-1 -.393 
27 Julie and Mark could learn a lot about themselves from having 
sex 
-2 -.893 
20 Julie and Mark’s experience could make them more well-
rounded, compassionate, and self-assured people                 
-3 -.990 
9 The sexual secret that Julie and Mark hold can draw them closer 
together  
-4 -1.251 
    
These statements evaluate Julie and Mark’s relationship according to a generalized nature 
despite what they have to say about it.  The statements that are most unlike this viewpoint 
show that a Human Nature does not belief that Julie and Mark could be better people or 
better siblings as a result of what they did. 
 A final theme that informs this viewpoint has to do with the consequences of 
actions. From a Human Nature viewpoint, consequences—whether positive or 
negative—do not change how Julie and Mark’s decision is viewed.  The nature of sex and 
of the relationship are more important than the outcomes of the action.  The most 
interesting statement that supports this theme deals is that this viewpoint does not think 
that the purpose of sex is for pleasure.  Even if a sexual experience is pleasurable, it does 
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not define the nature of sex.  Also, the avoidance of negative consequences does not 
change the belief about what sex is about.  Other statements that support this theme 
include: 
37 No form of sex is 100% safe from pregnancy and risk of disease 2 .590 
14 The purpose of sex is pleasure  -3 -.961 
34 Abortion and medication could fix any consequences to 
Julie and Mark’s actions  
-3 -1.048 
33 As long as no one gets hurt, there is no such thing as immoral 
sex  
-4 -1.545 
    
Focus on Outcomes: “What if someone found out?” 
The third factor is defined by four of the 40 sorts and accounts for 11% of the 
variance among the four rotated factors.  Although defined by a small number of sorts, it 
is a stable viewpoint that emerged from the analysis.  In thinking about the Julie and 
Mark vignette, the beliefs that this viewpoint describes are focused on the potential 
consequences of what Julie and Mark did.  The major themes are: 1. a concern that Julie 
and Mark might produce unintended outcomes, and 2. a focus on what other people 
within Julie and Mark’s social circles might think if they found out.  In describing this 
viewpoint, one participant expressed a concern about “what if someone found out?”   
Table 6 shows the statements that are most like and unlike framing what 
happened through a Outcomes.  In the table, the higher the array position and z-score 
indicates those statements most like this viewpoint, and a lower array position and z-
score indicates those statements most unlike this viewpoint.   
Table 6.    
 
Most like and most unlike statements for Outcomes 
    
# Statement Array 
Position 
z-score 




30 Making short-term decisions about sex could impact long-
term health and stability  
5 1.754 
40 Julie and Mark’s friends and family would think differently of 
them if they found out 
4 1.576 
39 Performing such a taboo sexual act could lead to more 
risky sexual behavior  
4 1.557 
21 Mark is using protection which will prevent against the 
spread of STIs  
4 1.288 
28 There can be negative consequences to sex other than 
unwanted pregnancy and STIs 
3 1.243 
11 Trying a sexual experience once is different from doing it all 
of the time  
3 1.182 
37 No form of sex is 100% safe from pregnancy and risk of 
disease  
3 1.243 
3 Julie is on birth control, so she most likely won’t get pregnant  3 1.182 
5 What Julie and Mark did is OK because they are consenting 
adults  
-3 -.811 
4 No one will ever find out about what Julie and Mark did  -3 -.883 
24 Any restrictions on sex are pointless and cruel  -3 -1.307 
9 The sexual secret that Julie and Mark hold can draw them 
closer together  
-3 -1.330 
20 Julie and Mark’s experience could make them more well-
rounded, compassionate, and self-assured people               
-4 -1.391 
18 There are no universal moral rules about sex  -4 -1.439 
15 What Julie and Mark did was wrong because it goes against 
human nature  
-4 -1.492 
36 Sexual morality comes from understanding human nature and 
the purpose of sex 
-5 -1.629 
13 The purpose of sex is for unity and procreation  -5 -1.87 
 
Table 6 demonstrates the full array of statements in the -5 to -3 positions and in the 3 to 5 
positions.  The statements in bold in the table are those statements that particularly 
distinguish Outcomes from the other viewpoint.  A distinguishing statement shows that 
the statements in this factor array that are placed in a position distinctly different—at a 
significance of at least p < .05—than the position of the same statement in the other 
factor’s arrays.   
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 The viewpoint described by Outcomes is defined by its concern for what happens 
as a result of an action.  When thinking about what Julie and Mark did, this viewpoint 
focuses on how successfully they can avoid negative consequences and produce positive 
outcomes.  In this regard, this viewpoint thinks seriously about the protections that Julie 
and Mark put in place to avoid unintended consequences.  
21 Mark is using protection which will prevent against the spread 
of STIs  
4 1.288 
3 Julie is on birth control, so she most likely won’t get pregnant  3 1.182 
11 Trying a sexual experience once is different from doing it all of the 
time 
3 1.068 
10 Julie and Mark say that they won’t ever do it again 1 .065 
 
With Mark using protection and Julie using birth control, there is a potential to avoid 
negative consequences such as the spread of disease or an unwanted pregnancy.  Also, 
since Julie and Mark will not be doing this again, the chances of repeated exposure to 
these consequences ends after this single event.  Nevertheless, Outcomes has some 
conceptual concerns such as: 
38 Sex between a brother and a sister destroys the sibling 
relationship 
5 1.940 
30 Making short-term decisions about sex could impact long-term 
health and stability  
5 1.754 
39 Performing such a taboo sexual act could lead to more risky 
sexual behavior  
4 1.557 
28 There can be negative consequences to sex other than unwanted 
pregnancy and STIs 
3 1.243 
37 No form of sex is 100% safe from pregnancy and risk of disease  3 1.24 




The concern demonstrated by placement of these statements for this factor array show a 
concern for a disruption in their relationship, future risky behavior, and the fact that 
infection and pregnancy cannot always be prevented or fixed.   
87 
 
 A second major theme from the factor array for Outcomes deals with what other 
people might think about what Julie and Mark did.  This includes those people who know 
Julie and Mark, but also the society within which they live.   
40 Julie and Mark’s friends and family would think differently of them 
if they found out 
4 1.576 
35 Julie and Mark did something wrong because the culture they live 
in says so  
2 .538 
16 What Julie and Mark did was wrong because it broke the law 1 .424 
41 People who have incestuous relationships should not hold certain 
positions in a civil society 
0 -.033 
 
Statement 41, in the zero position but with a negative z-score, in combination with 
statement 35, shows that the focus is on evaluating what they did based on what other’s 
think.  Just because Julie and Mark had sex, it does not mean they are unqualified to 
engage in society; but, since there could be a risk of others finding out, it could produce a 
negative consequence.  In this viewpoint, other people finding out what they did would 
produce a negative outcome since it would change the way people think about them.  
Also, there is a particular concern for breaking the law, which could result in punitive 
outcomes from society itself.   
Focus on Individuals in Context: “It’s not just about you.” 
The fourth factor is defined by four of the 40 sorts and accounts for 9% of the 
variance among the four rotated factors.  Of the four defining sorts, one of them had 
significant negative correlations with the factor; therefore, the inverse of this bipolar 
factor will be briefly described as well.  Although this factor array accounts for a small 
amount of the variance, it defines a stable viewpoint about the Julie and Mark story.  In 
thinking about the Julie and Mark vignette, the beliefs that this viewpoint represent are 
focused the particular situation in a particular context.  In this viewpoint, the major 
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themes are a framing the vignette with principles to then understand 1. a particular 
behavior (sex between Julie and Mark) within 2. a particular context (the relationship 
between a brother and sister).  In describing this viewpoint, one participant understood 
the autonomy that Julie and Mark had but explained that their relationship with each 
other was also interwoven with the web of their other relationships.  Even if no one found 
out this particular secret, “it’s not just about you” he said out of concern for how this 
interaction might have a ripple effect on the wider circle of relational entanglement.   
Table 7 shows the statements that are most like and unlike framing what 
happened through Individuals in Context.  In the table, the higher the array position and 
z-score indicates those statements most like this viewpoint, and a lower array position 
and z-score indicates those statements most unlike this viewpoint.   
Table 7.    
 
Most like and most unlike statements for Individuals in Context 
    




23 Sexual morality is about how you treat the people you’re 
with 
5 1.313 
30 Making short-term decisions about sex could impact long-term 
health and stability  
5 1.295 
36 Sexual morality comes from understanding human nature and 
the purpose of sex 
4 1.263 
17 Each sexual act needs to be evaluated in context  4 1.132 
31 People should refrain from immediate sexual gratification if it 
could impact their future goals  
4 1.263 
28 There can be negative consequences to sex other than 
unwanted pregnancy and STIs                    
3 1.029 
25 People should feel safe and free to have open conversations 
about their sexual desires 
3 .920 
13 The purpose of sex is for unity and procreation  3 .845 
14 The purpose of sex is pleasure  3 .752 
3 Julie is on birth control, so she most likely won’t get 
pregnant  
-3 -1.214 
18 There are no universal moral rules about sex  -3 -1.214 
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29 Julie and Mark say sex brought them closer together -3 -1.284 
35 Julie and Mark did something wrong because the culture they 
live in says so 
-3 -1.408 
24 Any restrictions on sex are pointless and cruel  -4 -1.412 
33  As long as no one gets hurt, there is no such thing as immoral 
sex  
-4 -1.428 
41 People who have incestuous relationships should not hold 
some jobs or positions within a civil society        
-4 -1.540 
16 What Julie and Mark did was wrong because it broke the law  -5 -1.826 
15 What Julie and Mark did was wrong because it goes against 
human nature  
-5 -1.827 
 
Table 7 demonstrates the full array of statements in the -5 to -3 positions and in the 3 to 5 
positions.  The statements in bold in the table are those statements that particularly 
distinguish Individuals in Context from the other viewpoints.  A distinguishing statement 
shows that the statements in this factor array that are placed in a position distinctly 
different—at a significance of at least p < .05—than the position of the same statement in 
the other factor’s arrays.   
 The first theme for Individuals in Context is to understand the particular behavior.  
First, this viewpoint identifies a principle to help frame its belief about what specifically 
happened.  These are: 
23 Sexual morality is about how you treat the people you’re with 5 2.084 
 
The principle acts as a starting point to frame the particular action between Julie and 
Mark.  If sexual morality is about how people are treated, what does this viewpoint think 
about what Julie and Mark did?  From the Individuals in Context viewpoint, Julie and 
Mark are focusing on the following when making their decision: 






The vignette does not explicitly discuss how Julie and Mark treated each other.  It does 
say that they decide together to have sex.  This was potentially decided after having a 
conversation together that took into account what Julie and Mark both wanted.  The 
ability to have this conversation was very like this viewpoint: 
25 People should feel safe and free to have open conversations about 
their sexual desires 
3 1.102 
 
But in terms of using their college time as a time of sexual experimentation shows an 
intent different from one of care.  That is, the primary concern has to do with Julie and 
Mark having a new sexual experience rather than treating each other the way they ought 
to be treated.  As such, this viewpoint does not agree that Julie and Mark are better off as 
a result: 
19 Julie and Mark are wrong about feeling closer together because 
unity in sex is about long-term connection 
2 .855 
20 Julie and Mark’s experience could make them more well-
rounded, compassionate, and self-assured people 
-1 -4.58 
9 The sexual secret that Julie and Mark hold can draw them 
closer together 
-1 -.497 
29 Julie and Mark say sex brought them closer together -3 -.936 
 
 The second theme is a focus on the particular context in which the action takes 
place.  This theme, like the first, is seen first from a principle and then from the 
particulars.  The general principle is: 
17 Each sexual act needs to be evaluated in context 4 1.680 
  
The particular context here is that Julie and Mark are on vacation together in France.  
But, the context also needs to account for interconnected relationships that Julie and 
Mark have with others.  In evaluating the particulars of this vignette, Individuals in 
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Context does not believe that the romantic potential of the vacation is a sufficient cause 
for the behavior.  Also, simply being alone with no one else around is not a sufficient 
context for doing a particular action: 
1 Julie and Mark were in a romantic location so they naturally 
felt more connected than usual 
0 -.291 
4 No one will ever find out about what Julie and Mark did -1 -.637 
10 Julie and Mark say they won’t ever do it again -2 -.809 
 
 Individuals in Context start with principles that frame its viewpoint of what Julie 
and Mark did.  It is the evaluation of the particular behavior in a particular context that 
define what the viewpoint believes.  People have the autonomy to make decisions 
according to their own principles, but they need to reference these principles and put the 
situations within context of their whole lived experiences. 
Inverse of this Viewpoint. Individuals in Context is defined by a sort with a strong 
negative correlation indicating that the inverse of this viewpoint is also a distinct 
viewpoint.  The inverse of Individuals in Context is easily distinguished from the 
viewpoint on its focus on principles only.  With Individuals in Context, there were 
principles that initially framed the viewpoint, but it was the attention to the particular 
behavior of Julie and Mark in a particular context that defined it.  The inverse is highly 
principled, much more so than the Individuals in Context, but lacked addressing the 
unique circumstances of Julie and Mark in figuring out what to believe about the 
vignette.  This is demonstrated by the placement following principled statements within 
the array: 
15 What Julie and Mark did was wrong because it goes against 
human nature 
5 1.550 
16 What Julie and Mark did was wrong because it broke the law 5 1.438 
41 People who have incestuous relationships should not hold some 4 1.250 
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jobs or positions within a civil society 
35 Julie and Mark did something wrong because the culture they live 
in says so 
3 .948 
 
Research Question 2: Differences by Condition of Instruction 
 The second research question was: How do the viewpoints differ by condition of 
instruction?  This study used a small sample of four expert participants, but collected a 
large amount of data by having each participant sort the same 47 statements 10 times 
under different conditions of instruction.  These conditions of instruction allowed the 
participants to sort according to their own perspective, but also required them to sort 
according to other perspectives.  Table 1 above shows each of the 40 sorts labeled by 
sorter and condition of instruction.   Table 8 represents this data as a tally mark under the 
viewpoints when a sort defined the viewpoint for that condition of instruction. 
Table 8.     
 
Number of defining sorts by condition of instruction  








1. What do you think about what 
Julie and Mark Did?   
 3  1 
2. What was Julie Thinking 3    
3. What would Julie and Mark’s 
parents think about this? 
 1 1  
4. What would you have thought 
about this situation when you were 
in college 
1 2 1  
5. What might a person you look up 
to think about this? 
 3  1 
6. What was Mark thinking? 4    
7. What might someone who 
supports Julie and Mark’s decision 
think about what they did? 
4    
8. What does the most impulsive side 
of you think about this? 




9. What do you think about this from 
a purely practical perspective? 
 
2  1 1 
10. What do you think about what 
Julie and Mark did? 
 
 3  1 
 
 This table shows three times that a condition of instruction resulted in sorts that 
defined a single factor, showing consensus across sorters: condition 2, condition 6, and 
condition 7.  The chart below shows the sorts for these three conditions of instruction. 
 Sorts for Condition 3, 6, and 7 
      
Sort Sorter Personal 
Autonomy 
Human Nature Outcomes Individuals in 
Context 
 2 What was Julie Thinking 
25 3 0.8243X -0.1281 -0.1597 -0.1058 
17 2 0.7666X -0.2854 -0.1342 -0.1260 
33 4 0.7535X 0.0266 0.0407 -0.1828 
9 1 -0.5549 0.3875 0.3408 -0.0527 
 6 What was Mark thinking? 
13 1 0.7929X -0.3138 -0.2501 0.0751 
21 2 0.7815X -0.2722 -0.0933 -0.1359 
37 4 0.7763X -0.1827 -0.0854 -0.0453 
29 3 0.7706X -0.3239 -0.1882 -0.0386 
 7 What might someone who supports Julie and Mark’s decision think about 
what they did? 
14 1 0.7803X -0.3394 -0.1920 0.1723 
22 2 0.7730X -0.2711 -0.0998 -0.0714 
38 4 0.7068X -0.2862 0.0192 -0.0739 
30 2 0.6887X -0.4624 -0.1956 -0.0375 
      
 These three conditions of instruction were explicitly provided to give each sorter 
the opportunity to express what they think Julie and Mark were thinking that led them to 
make the decision that they did (conditions 2 and 6).  Condition 7 was used to incite a 
third party perspective of someone who is not Julie and Mark but who might think like 
them or support their action.  These 11 sorts account for nearly 70% of all the sorts that 
94 
 
defined Personal Autonomy.  The sorts within these conditions of instruction had strong 
positive correlations with Personal Autonomy, but negative correlations with Human 
Nature.  This is particularly true for the conditions about Mark’s perspective and the 
condition about the perspective of someone who supports them (conditions 6 and 7 
respectively). 
 Human Nature had conditions of instruction whose sorts strongly defined the 
viewpoint.  Three conditions of instruction had three of the four sorts defining it.  These 
were conditions 1, 5, and 10.  The chart below shows the sorts for these conditions of 
instruction. 
 Sorts for Condition 1, 5, and 10 
      
Sort Sorter Personal 
Autonomy 
Human Nature Outcomes Individuals in 
Context 
 1 What do you think about what Julie and Mark Did?   
5 3 -0.4097 0.8126X 0.0931 0.1320 
7 4 -0.5095 0.7684X 0.1738 0.1368 
3 2 -0.4155 0.7474X 0.2713 0.2430 
1 1 0.0906 -0.2870 -0.1679 -0.6916X 
 5 What might a person you look up to think about this? 
20 2 -0.4155 0.7474X 0.2713 0.2430 
36 4 -0.4870 0.7206X 0.1042 0.1671 
28 3 -0.5554 0.6838X 0.1869 0.1737 
12 1 -0.0947 -0.0455 -0.0015 0.8990X 
 10 What do you think about what Julie and Mark did? 
8 4 -0.5196 0.7491X 0.0827 0.1756 
4 2 -0.4155 0.7474X 0.2713 0.2430 
6 3 -0.5269 0.6901X 0.2520 0.1878 
2 1 -0.0663 0.3799 0.1926 0.7616X 
      
 .  The sort for each condition of instruction that did not define Human Nature 
defined Individuals in Context.  This sort for condition 1 had a negative correlation with 
the viewpoint, but helps demonstrate a similar pattern: that participants represented their 
own perspective in a similar way that they represented the perspective of someone they 
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look up to.  Interestingly, the correlations for condition 5 more closely represent the 
correlations for condition 10.  After participants sorted from the perspective of someone 
they looked up to, their own perspective more closely matched that perspective than it did 
their original perspective.  This is most evident for Individuals in Context.   
 Conditions of instruction that asked participants to sort from their perspective or 
from a perspective of someone they looked up to defined different factors than conditions 
that asked participants to sort according to the perspective of Julie, Mark, or someone that 
supports them.  Conditions 2, 6, and 7 define a factor that is different from what 
conditions 1, 5, and 10 defined.  The consensus among participants was high for these 
conditions.  For one participant, sorts 1, 5, and 10 defined a different factor than the other 
three, but the pattern was similar.  Other conditions of instruction showed more 
divergence among participants and among the conditions themselves.   
 Outcomes was fully defined by different conditions of instruction than those 
already discussed.  Interestingly, each of the four defining sorts for this viewpoint came 
for four different conditions of instruction and different participants.  There is also no real 
relationship between this viewpoint and the others.  Referring above to Table 2, the 
correlations between factor scores shows very little overlap between this viewpoint and 
the others.  Different conditions of instruction (3, 4, 8, and 9) led participants to articulate 
this viewpoint, but there was not agreement between any two or more participants about 
this viewpoint on the same condition of instruction.      
 Sorts that define Outcomes 
      
Sort Sorter Personal 
Autonomy 
Human Nature Outcomes Individuals in 
Context 
  
 3 What would Julie and Mark’s parents think about this? 
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34 4 -0.1933 0.2889 0.6935X 0.0305 
  
 4 What would you have thought about this when you were in college 
35 4 -0.2520 0.3620 0.6088X 0.1035 
  
 8 What does the most impulsive side of you think about this? 
23 2 0.0935 0.1011 0.9106X 0.1407 
  
 9 What do you think about this from a purely practical perspective 
24 2 0.1182 0.0132 0.9039X 0.1454 
      
Research Question 3: Defining the Features of Belief Subspaces 
 Each of the four factor arrays demonstrated within the first two research questions 
are interpreted as stable viewpoints regarding the Julie and Mark vignette without 
reference to a yes/no dichotomy.  Each of these viewpoints was given a descriptive name 
that synthesized the major themes that defined them.  The viewpoints share a common set 
of statements that were used to express particular beliefs about Julie and Mark did, but 
each viewpoint is unique in that it arranges the statements in a different way.  Although 
the viewpoints are complex and highly descriptive, they can be used to provide the 
defining features of the yes and no belief projections (Figure 1).  Providing the features of 
these belief projections resolves the issue from Haidt et al. (2000) in which the 
researchers conclude that people can make the yes and no belief projections but that the 
beliefs have no defining features.   
In the original research with the Julie and Mark vignette, Haidt et al. (2000) first 
asked participants if they thought what Julie and Mark did was wrong before asking them 
to explain why.  This belief projection can be visualized by representing these two 
mutually exclusive options as vector spaces within Hilbert Space.   In the visualization, 
the belief that yes what they was wrong is orthogonal to the belief that no what they did 
was not wrong.  Before being asked the question, the belief state of participants is not 
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committed to either option.  To answer the question, they project a belief onto the yes 
vector space or the no vector space.  In the Haidt et al. (2000) study, participants were 
able to make this belief projection.  They were not, however, able to define the features 
of their belief projection.  Haidt et al. (2000) conclude that defining features of these 
belief spaces do not exist.  The findings of the Q study presented herein show that 
defining features of the beliefs do exist.   
In performing the 10 sorts about the Julie and Mark dilemma, participants were 
not asked whether or not they believed that Julie and Mark did something right or wrong.  
The explicit answer to this question was not needed in order for the participants to sort 
their perspective and the perspective of others as required by the specific condition of 
instruction.  Nevertheless, the data can explicitly show defining features of these two 
subspaces. 
Selection of statements   
      
 Relational Physical Cultural Moral TOTAL 
Yes, what they did was 
wrong 
2 3 3 5 
13 
No, what they did was not 
wrong 
3 5 5 5 
18 
Neutral judgment  6 0 2 2 11 
TOTAL 11 8 10 12  
 
In populating the set of statements for the study, careful attention was made to 
identify a set of statements from the concourse of all possible statements that was 
representative of diverse viewpoints about the story.  That is, the statements were 
selected to provide participants with the tools they needed to represent their viewpoint, 
regardless of what that viewpoint was, without being limited in their outlook by the finite 
set of statements to sort.  To do this, the 4 x 3 design shown above was implemented to 
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select statements.  Often times in Q research, focus groups are used to generate 
statements; but due to the sensitive nature of the vignette, a selection of statements from 
current literature in the field was chosen.   
While not equal across all categories, the statements came from a distribution of 
all of the categories.  These categories were a tool to help in the selection of statements 
and do not represent definitive divisions in viewpoint that all people would agree with.  
These categories were unknown to the participants during the sort.   
Figure 5. 
A representation of Personal Autonomy by yes/no coding for +2 to +5 
      
           
           
       NO NO NO  
       NO NO  NO 
       NO   NO 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Blank spaces in the +2 to +5 columns represent neutral judgment statements 
 
 Each of the factor arrays places statements from these categories in different 
places.  The viewpoint defined by Personal Autonomy, for example, places no what they 
did was not wrong and neutral judgment statements in all of the positions from +2 to +5.  
Blank boxes represent statements of neutral judgment.  In contrast, Human Nature has 
relatively strong negative correlation with a Focus on Personal Autonomy (-.7015).  This 
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viewpoint has yes what they did was wrong or neutral judgment statements in all of the 
positions from +2 to +5. Blank boxes again represent statements of neutral judgment.  
  Figure 6. 
A representation of Human Nature by yes/no coding for +2 to +5 
           
           
       YES    
       YES YES YES  
       YES YES YES YES 
        YES  YES 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Blank spaces in the +2 to +5 columns represent neutral judgment statements 
These charts can be represented as the mutually exclusive belief projections visualized as 
the vectors in the Hilbert space model.  In this way, the statements associated with the yes 
and no boxes above can define the features of the belief subspace.  In the As Haidt et al. 
(2000) study, participants answered the yes/no question, but could not explain why.  
Using a Q study, participants are able to provide statements that define these beliefs.  One 
example of the features of these beliefs can be show by statements associated with the yes 
and no boxes in the charts above.  Here, the belief projections for yes and no can be 
thought of as subspaces in Hilbert space having features that are defined by the 
statements associated with viewpoints.  Table 9 represents an example of defining 




 Table 9. 
 
Features of the belief subspaces for YES they did something wrong and NO they did not 
 
𝑱𝒖𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒂𝒏𝒅𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒌 = { |𝑱𝒖𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒂𝒏𝒅𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒊⟩, 𝒊 = 𝟏, 𝑵} 
 
Yes: it was wrong No: it was not wrong 
  
𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑦𝑒𝑠 ⊂  𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘
= { |𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖⟩, 𝑖
= 1, 𝑁} 
𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑛𝑜 ⊂  𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘
= { |𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖⟩, 𝑖
= 1, 𝑁} 
  
Sexual morality comes from understanding 
human nature and the purpose of sex 
Having sex is their personal choice and not 
a moral concern 
 
What they did was wrong because it goes 
against human nature 
 
Trying a sexual experience once is different 
from doing it all of the time 
 
The purpose of sex is for unity and 
procreation 
 
Sex brings them closer together 
 
Sex between a brother and a sister destroys 
the sibling relationship 
 
What they did is OK because they are 
consenting adults 
 
Making short-term decisions about sex 
could impact long-term health and stability 
 
Some relationships are romantic and 
sexual, but some are just sexual 
 
They are wrong about feeling closer 
together because unity in sex is about long-
term connection 
 
The purpose of sex is pleasure 
 
They should only have sex with the people 
they marry 
 
Abortion and medication could fix any 
consequences to their actions 
 
Summary 
 In this chapter, the data from a Q study were presented.  Four participants sorted 
41 statements on a board according to ten different perspectives.  Without being asked 
directly if what Julie and Mark did was wrong, each participant operationalized a 
viewpoint according the perspective under consideration in each condition of instruction.  
What emerged were four viewpoints defined by the placement of statements in a 
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particular order.  These viewpoints are complex and richly descriptive; they move beyond 
a simple yes or no belief about what Julie and Mark did.  Since the yes and no belief 
projections were important to the Haidt et al. (2000) study on the Julie and Mark vignette, 
the data from viewpoints of the Q study were shown in those terms.   
For an example of how this could be done, the statements placed in the +2, +3, 
+4, and +5 columns from Personal Autonomy and Human Nature were shown on a board 
according to how they were coded: yes it was wrong, no it was not wrong, and neutral 
judgment.  Personal Autonomy had no and neutral statements in these columns while 
Human Nature had yes or neutral statements in these positions. 
To visualize this, the yes and no beliefs were represented as vector spaces in 
Hilbert space.  In this visualization, participants from the Haidt et al. (2000) study were 
seen as having a belief state that projected onto the subspaces for either yes or no 
depending on how they responded to the question.  In the Haidt et al. (2000) study, 
participants were able to make these belief projections, but were unable to define the 
features of these beliefs.  By replacing the yes and no beliefs with the corresponding 
statements from the Q sort, the data from Q study was able to provide features to the 
subspace that define these beliefs.  This could be done for each of the factor arrays, and 
an example was provided using two of them.  The results presented in response to the 
third research question provide a correction to the Haidt et al. (2000) study in which the 
researchers concluded that participants could not articulate the features of their beliefs.   
The complex beliefs that people might have about the Julie and Mark vignette 
were demonstrated in part by the viewpoints presented in response to the first research 
question.  The viewpoints that emerged are empirically stable and definable beliefs about 
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a moral dilemma.  No normative claims or expectations were imported into the study.  
Also, no normative claims are extrapolated from the data.  Rather, the results of the study 
defined a complex set of viewpoints held by the participants at the time of the study.  In 
this way, no a priori expectations were made regarding what people ought to think, and 
no judgments were made about what people did think.  It remains neutral to both schools 
of thought.  
In the next chapter—which was never possible in the Haidt et al. (2000) study—
the normative moral principles from philosophy will be put into conversation with the 
data.  Now that features of some particular beliefs are defined in complex terms and with 
robust information, viewpoints can engage with the normative arguments of philosophy 
and cultural expectations of society.  In chapter 5, a discussion of data will show the 






SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
  
The purpose of this research was to investigate the complex beliefs that expert 
participants might hold regarding the Julie and Mark vignette.  To do this, a quantum 
model of decision making was articulated and a corresponding methodology was 
identified to perform the research.  The first aspect of the quantum model involved 
representing the yes or no believes of participants regarding the Julie and Mark vignette 
as described in Haidt et al. (2000) as belief projections in Hilbert space.  In their study, 
participants answered the question, “Did Julie and Mark do something wrong?” by giving 
a yes or no response.  This was visualized by orthogonal arrays that served as belief 
subspaces that participants projected onto.  In this model, participants create a belief 
when they answer the question and project onto the corresponding belief state.  These 
belief states have features.  Haidt et al. (2000) could not provide the defining features of 
these subspaces. To investigate the beliefs that people might have about the Julie and 
Mark vignette, an appropriate methodology needed to be put in place.  Q methodology 
provided the tools and techniques needed.  The use of Q sorts provided the second aspect 
of the quantum model.  
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During Q sorting, participants operationalize their perspectives to create a 
viewpoint as an array of statements.  The goal here was to measure the transitive 
properties that involve self-referentiality.  Utilizing the concept of complementarity from 
quantum theory, the sorting procedure demonstrated the “quantumization” of 
communicability (Stephenson, 1989, p. 15).  Measuring the operationalized self-
referential viewpoints of participants served as the scientific exploration of subjectivity.  
This process ignored the yes/no dichotomy of the original Haidt et al. (2000) study in 
order to define viewpoints that were complex and highly descriptive.  The study brought 
together the two concepts by representing beliefs within the frame of the yes and no  
Hilbert space representations.  The features of the viewpoints from the Q study were able 
to give defining features to these belief projections in a way that the original study was 
unable to do.   
Summary of Findings 
 The findings of this study were presented as four unique viewpoints about what 
Julie and Mark did.  These viewpoints were interpreted as Personal Autonomy, Human 
Nature, Outcomes, and Individuals in Context.  The Personal Autonomy viewpoint was 
created when participants sorted under conditions of instruction that related to taking 
Julie and Mark’s perspective.  It focused on the ability of Julie and Mark to make a 
choice together without concern for external expectations.  Regardless of what society or 
moral standards might expect, if Julie and Mark consented to the act, it was their personal 
choice. 
 Human Nature is concerned about the universal principles that apply to all people.  
It expressed human sexuality as having a particular purpose and meaning that all people 
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need to consider.  It also expressed a belief that long-term goals are more important than 
short-term gratification.  The focus was on the future self rather than the desires of the 
immediate self in the present. 
 Outcomes is worried about what might happen if someone found out or if some 
other unintended outcome occurred.  So long as there were no negative consequences, 
Julie and Mark might very well make any decision they want.  But given the taboo nature 
of the act and the beliefs help by society, there was a concern that if someone found out it 
might have a negative impact on their relationships and ability to hold certain jobs in 
society.  Moreover, despite using protection, there is always a chance of pregnancy or 
transmission of illness.   
 Individuals in Context accepted that the internal standards that Julie and Mark 
carry give them some amount of independence, but they do not exist in isolation.  That is, 
Julie and Mark need to think about the context of their actions and how they are 
interwoven in a wider web of relationships.  While this perspective was not worried 
someone would find out, it articulated a concern that the action could have future impacts 
on their lives and on the lives of those other people they also have relationships with.   
 The conditions of instruction were instrumental in creating these viewpoints.  
Many of the viewpoints were stabilized by conditions of instruction that had the sorters 
see the story through similar perspectives.  For example, taking the perspective of Julie, 
Mark, and someone who supports them (conditions 2, 6, and 7) defined Personal 
Autonomy, with nearly unanimous consensus by the sorters.   
 The dichotomy of yes and no was not fundamental to the articulation of these 
viewpoints.  This question was never specifically asked to the participants about their 
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own perspectives or about the perspectives of others given in the conditions of 
instruction.  Presumably, the participants were thinking about this question during their 
sort, and the data, is able to represent the dichotomy as it was presented in Haidt et al. 
(2000).  In representing the data with yes or no coding, the corresponding statements 
were able to provide an example of the features of these beliefs as represented by the 
participants in this study.   
Conclusions 
 There are several important conclusions to be made after analyzing the data from 
the study.  First, people can give descriptive explanations of their viewpoints about the 
Julie and Mark vignette.  In previous studies, people could say that what Julie and Mark 
did was right or wrong, but they were unable to articulate what defined such a 
conclusion.  By providing participants with statements, sampled from a concourse of all 
possible statements, they could arrange them according to their self-referential believes 
on the subject.  The sampling of statements was done theoretically to account for a wide 
range of concepts about what they did and to account for diversity in viewpoint.  While 
the participants were limited to the statements presented to them, the statements were 
simple, easy to communicate thoughts that any person would understand.  Q 
methodology provided participants with a tool to use in expressing what they believed.  
Collectively, the participants communicated viewpoints that were stabilized by having 
multiple participants and/or multiple conditions of instruction defining it.  The factor 
analysis technique used by Q methodology allowed these to emerge. The beliefs that 
people have about the Julie and Mark vignette can described.  Not only do people have 
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viewpoints on the vignette, but these viewpoints can be defined by themes.  The themes 
of the viewpoints led to the descriptive names given to them.   
 This creates significant doubt that people are morally dumbfounded about their 
decisions as Haidt et al. (2000) concluded.  The conclusion of moral dumbfounding has 
gained a lot of traction in the field and has even become the interest of more popular 
psychology discussions in places such as Psychology Today (Sommers, 2008).  By being 
able to describe the complex viewpoints of participants in such a descriptive way, a 
conclusion of dumbfounding is not valid.  There have been a number of responses to the 
idea of moral dumbfounding along philosophical and psychological grounds.  Royzman, 
Kim, and Leeman (2015) provide three studies using the Julie and Mark vignette that 
support a rationalist view of moral decision making that contradicts the idea of moral 
dumbfounding.  Specifically, they note the “need for a lucid and thoughtful discussion on 
what may or may not count as supporting reasons in the context of a moral judgment 
task” (p. 311).  The present research study supports the work that others are doing to 
show that moral dumbfounding might not be a valid conclusion.  What is unique to this 
study, though, is that a robust description of actual viewpoints is made available using Q 
methodology which satisfy the requirements of what does count as supporting reasons for 
a belief.     
 This is the second conclusion, that the descriptions of the viewpoints provide 
good reasons for the belief.  The features of the belief subspaces for yes and no as 
provided by the statements of the Q sorts demonstrate a complex and articulate 
viewpoint.  Moral dumbfounding was offered as an explanation from why participants in 
the Haidt et al. (2000) could answer yes and no but could not give a good reason for 
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holding the belief.  This study shows that people can provide a description of a complex 
and well thought-out viewpoint.  The viewpoints that emerged in this study do not 
represent post-hoc justifications for belief projections because they were articulated by 
participants who never answered the yes or no question.  The viewpoints are not 
rationalizations for an intuitive and emotional reaction to the Julie and Mark vignette.  
Rather, they show a stable structure of belief that has clear and defining features.  Human 
Nature, for example, articulates a very clear perspective on the purpose of sex and the 
importance of future-focused decision making.  The themes that define the viewpoint are 
articulations of an underlying worldview that was used to understand the vignette.  
Likewise, Individuals in Context describes an understanding of the complex web of 
human relationships that can even be impacted by the private actions of just a few 
individuals.  When these themes were used to define the features of the belief projections 
in Hilbert space, it showed that participants have very good reasons to project to one 
space or the other.   
 Dwyer (2009) agrees that moral dumbfounding has implications for moral 
psychology, but thinks that the lessons that one ought to draw from it are different than 
what is currently being proposed.  To do this, she advances the Linguistic Analogy theory 
in moral psychology which proposes that “human moral and linguistic capacities are 
normative capacities of biological creatures” (Dwyer, 2009, p. 275).  The theory draws 
on the work in generative linguistics to describe the mental structures and “computations 
that implement the ubiquitous and apparently unbounded human capacity for making 
moral judgements (Dwyer, Huebner, & Hauser, 2010, p. 487).  Within this frame, Dwyer, 
Huebner, and Hauser (2010) note that what is “apparently deliberative” reasoning in 
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humans is often subject to “irrelevant effects of context” (p. 499).  If moral psychology is 
trying to show that people are making rational moral computations rather than relying on 
more general processes like deliberation and reflection, one would need to show that 
moral judgement does “not rely on the same heuristic strategies for reducing uncertainty” 
that others claim are in use (p. 499).  This research study rejected heuristic models of 
decision making in favor of a quantum one.  Dwyer et al. (2010) claim that if one could 
show that heuristic strategies are not at play in these moral decisions, one might be able 
to show that domain-specific computational principles are in play for judgments in 
conditions of uncertainty (p. 499). This was explicitly demonstrated in this study through 
the quantum conceptualization of consciousness, through an understanding of connatural 
knowledge, and through the use of Q methodology—to which quantum theory also 
applies.    
 Third, the self-referential viewpoints of participants were relatively stable 
throughout the experiment.  The first and last condition of instruction had participants 
sort the board according to their own perspectives.  For all participants, the final sort 
came during a second session, many days after the first.  The participants had to engage 
with the other conditions of instruction before returning to their own perspective.  
Nevertheless, each participant defined the same viewpoint at the start and finish of the 
experiment.  This gives support for the above conclusion that the viewpoints are good 
stable reasons for holding a belief about Julie and Mark.  Moreover, the stability in the 
individual viewpoints shows a level of rationality that would make future engagement 
with the viewpoint possible.   
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 If explanations of beliefs are post-hoc rationalizations, they would not be stable 
enough to engage with.  These viewpoints, however, are stable reasons for holding a 
belief and they are consequently robust enough to engage with.  Dwyer et al. (2010) note 
that people often neglect the importance of situational factors when looking a decisions, 
and instead rely on assumptions about character (p. 499).  This study, through its focus on 
psychological events, took not only situational factors seriously but also historical 
interbehavioral contexts.  At the same time, it relied on the communication of operant 
subjectivity to define viewpoints; it did not resort to claims on a person’s character.  
Behavior is both subjective and operant: subjective since it is a person’s viewpoint, and 
operant because it exists naturally within a particular setting (Brown, 1980).  Hence, the 
emergence of viewpoints in this study took situational factors seriously but in a way that 
was removed from constructed effects.  The stability of viewpoint was observed from the 
findings without reference a priori claims of enduring character qualities of the 
participants.  Nevertheless, consciousness as communication of connatural knowledge 
provided an argument for why one would expect such stability over time.    
Implications 
 The debate about how to do moral psychology is largely about what to do with 
normative moral claims.  The first issue is whether or not one ought important any 
normative philosophical principles at all.  The influential work Kohlberg had imported 
the normative expectations of Kantian philosophy into the realm of moral psychology, 
something that the field has struggled with in recent decades (Kristjansson, 2009).  If 
someone were to want to integrate moral philosophy so explicitly at the start of 
psychological research, it still begs the question of whether or not Kantian moral 
111 
 
philosophy is the right type of philosophy to be doing.  In the Kohlbergian model, 
normative moral philosophy is used as a guide to the research itself, a type of moralized 
psychology (Kristjansson, 2009).  In contrast, some have disregarded moral philosophy in 
favor of a psychologized morality (Kristjansson, 2009).  Both approaches attempt to 
answer the fundamental question of which discipline is supposed to take the lead when 
doing work at the intersection of moral philosophy and psychology.   
 The present research addressed the issue by accepting the need for a priori 
philosophical assumptions.  At the same time, the a priori assumptions did not come 
from moral philosophy and did not attempt to create a moralized psychology.  Rather, the 
a priori assumptions from philosophy where those that defined the nature of human 
subjectivity in order to find a methodology appropriate to measure psychological events.  
In keeping with the Kohlberg model, the present study accepted that morality needs to be 
defined in terms of the formal character of a moral judgement or a moral viewpoint, 
which is best seen in “the reason given for a moral judgement” (Kohlberg, 1980, p.53).  
In keeping with the psychologized morality model, it did not adopt expectations about 
what would constitute a proper moral viewpoint from the start.  The research made no 
hypothesis about the types of viewpoints he expected to find, nor were any judgments 
made regarding the quality of the viewpoints once they were interpreted.     
 In the model implemented for this research, concern was given to accurately 
defining and measuring self-referential subjectivity.  With the quantum model, 
subjectivity was seen as an individual’s ability to communicate his viewpoint by 
operationalizing it during a Q sort.  By providing participants a large number of 
statements that were philosophically diverse, there were no a priori judgments that 
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loaded the research.  Moreover, the quantum model seen in Q methodology accounts for 
an operationalized perspective at the time of the sort.  While participants demonstrated 
consistency in perspective across the study, it makes no conclusion that the sorts 
represent an unchanging belief.  That model accepts that future sorts with the same 
statements could be different and reflect a specific belief at the time.  That is to say, it is 
not meant to predict future viewpoints or future actions.  As such, it could not be used to 
define expected future behaviors.   What it does provide is a generalized understanding of 
a participant’s beliefs that could be useful in future engagement.   
Theoretical Implications 
 Kristjansson (2009) explains how those doing psychologized morality often focus 
on method while those doing moralized psychology often focus on “problems at hand” 
(p. 833).  The present research addresses both method and the need to engage with moral 
problems.  The research presented here has implications for moral psychology’s ability to 
have conversations with normative ethics and moral philosophy.  Understanding 
someone’s viewpoint in such a descriptive way provides an immensely useful tool for 
someone doing normative work.  The viewpoints expressed in this study about the Julie 
and Mark vignette were presented by description of their features and without judgment 
from any normative standards.  While the factor arrays required interpretation, this was 
done through engagement with the statements and their placements, and through follow-
up interviews.  Interpretations were neutral against judgements that would render them 
good or bad viewpoints.   
 The a priori assumptions about the nature of consciousness and subjectivity were 
required to find the methodological tools for study.  Kristjansson (2009) argues that 
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“there cannot be a ‘philosophically neutral’ or ‘value free’ social-science account of the 
self or if its constitutive elements” (p. 832).  At the same time he acknowledges that there 
cannot be a “reasonably developed philosophical theory of the self without grounding in 
the empirical knowledge of how people actually think about the self” (p. 832).  The 
present study satisfies both of these concerns.  It also accepts that moral psychology 
cannot produce prescriptive expectations even though it can be evaluative (Kristjansson, 
2009).   
Education and Practice 
 With the interpretation of the factor arrays, any form of normative moral 
philosophy can be put into conversation with the viewpoints.  Someone doing work in 
natural law theory, for example, could hold as a normative standard that incest is wrong, 
and can conclude that Personal Autonomy is a wrong view to hold about what Julie and 
Mark did.  He could use the principles from his normative view of morality to not simply 
conclude that Personal Autonomy is an incorrect moral viewpoint, but he could engage 
very intricately with all of the themes of the viewpoint.  Since such a robust analysis of 
the viewpoint is possible with Q methodology, it provides a rich set of data to engage 
with.   
 There are important implications of the conclusions for moral education.  In the 
theoretical implications, one could interact with the viewpoints without reference to 
particular individuals.  From a practical aspect, though, follow up work could be done 
with the individual participants.  The correlation to an individual’s sort to the stabilized 
viewpoints can serve as a tool for further engagement.  Someone doing work in moral 
education could use the data provided during the Q study as a guide to future work with 
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the participant who sorted the boards.  In this case, one could have engage with the 
participant about his personal beliefs with the aid of the Q data.  In the Haidt et al. (2000) 
study, participants were unable to provide an explanation for their decisions.  This gives 
essentially no information to someone who would like to further engage with the 
participant on his beliefs.   
 In this study, short follow up interviews were used as a means to analyze some 
aspects of the viewpoints.  Participants were given the opportunity to explain how they 
defined terms and concepts as it related to different perspectives.  This was part of the 
descriptive work with the data.  In the process of moral education, though, one could 
perform a similar interview to engage individual perspectives with normative moral 
claims and expectations.  In moral education, knowing that someone believes that what 
Julie and Mark did was not wrong gives some information to engage with.  It lacks the 
nuance of the Q data, though, as it simply articulates a complicated issue as a simple 
dichotomy.  Perhaps the real viewpoint has something to do with believing that it what 
Julie and Mark did this one time was not wrong, but that following through with it again 
would be?  In this case, the practical engagement with the person would be different.  
This research provides data regarding the nuances of the perspectives so that the practical 
engagement with the perspectives can be deeply explored. 
Quantum Cognition and Decision Making 
 The use of Hilbert space was important for this study in that it helped visualize 
the setup of the original experiment with the Julie and Mark vignette.  It visualized 
participant’s beliefs as subspaces that had features.  The data from this study could be 
used to define those subspaces.  This has implications for the work being done in 
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quantum cognition and decision making where people are often asked to project to 
mutually exclusive spaces.   
 For example, studies have been done on participant’s beliefs regarding the 
innocence or guilt of a defendant when provided with particular information.  McKenzie, 
Lee, and Chen (2002) examined how participants changed their confidence of guilt as 
participants were given evidence on both sides of a criminal case.  Trueblood and 
Busemeyer (2011) reinvestigated the experiment within the framework of a quantum 
model of cognition and decision making.  Mathematically, they used the quantum model 
to model order effects in “terms of the change of viewpoints produced by evaluating 
different sources of information” (p. 1548).  In reviewing information from the 
perspective of the prosecution and from the perspective of the defense had implications 
for belief projects.  It was understood that the belief projections of guilty or innocent have 
features (presumably informed by the evidence provided).  It is not always necessary to 
know exactly why someone projected a belief, which was the case for their work.  In the 
example of the Julie and Mark research, though, the features of these subspaces is 
extremely important to understanding why someone would choose one projection over 
another. If one were interested in fully understanding the features of the belief subspaces, 
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Q Set     
 z-scores by factor 
# Statement 1 2 3 4 
      
1 Julie and Mark were in a romantic location so they naturally felt more connected 
than usual 0.60 0.03 -0.57 -0.29 
2 This was an opportunity for Julie and Mark to have a new experience together 1.26 -0.50 -0.59 -0.26 
3 Julie is on birth control, so she most likely won’t get pregnant 0.65   0.14   0.86   -0.86 
4 No one will ever find out about what Julie and Mark did    0.75    -0.09   -0.88   -0.64   
5 What Julie and Mark did is OK because they are consenting adults     0.84    -0.96   -0.81   0.07   
6 Having sex is Julie and Mark’s personal choice and not a moral concern 1.31    -1.66 -0.08 -0.65   
7 Julie and Mark both think sex is fun and interesting     1.13    0.18   -0.21 0.11   
8 Julie and Mark are using the college years as a time of sexual exploration     0.68   0.13   0.20   0.30   
9 The sexual secret that Julie and Mark hold can draw them closer together 0.33   -1.25   -1.33 -0.50 
10 Julie and Mark say they won’t ever do it again        0.56   0.18   0.06   -0.81   
11 Trying a sexual experience once is different from doing it all of the time     1.30    0.57   1.07    0.54   
12 From a scientific perspective, Julie and Mark did nothing wrong     0.52   -0.25   -0.48   -0.66   
13 The purpose of sex is for unity and procreation       -1.28   1.36    -1.88   1.07    
14 The purpose of sex is pleasure 0.70   -0.99 0.04   0.94    
15 What Julie and Mark did was wrong because it goes against human nature     -1.83   1.80    -1.49   -1.55   
16 What Julie and Mark did was wrong because it broke the law -0.94   -0.08   0.42   -1.44 
17 Each sexual act needs to be evaluated in context      1.03    -0.34   0.45   1.68    
18 There are no universal moral rules about sex          0.52   -2.03   -1.44   -0.93   
19 Julie and Mark are wrong about feeling closer together because united in sex is 
about long-term connection    -1.41   1.07    -0.39   0.86   
20 Julie and Mark’s experience could make them a more well-rounded, 
compassionate, and self-assured people    0.38   -1.05   -1.39 -0.48   
21 Mark is using protection which will prevent against the spread of STIs 0.56   0.22   1.29    -0.75   
22 Julie and Mark should only have sex with the people they marry    -1.54   1.06    -0.78   0.31   
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23 Sexual morality is about how you treat the people -0.19   -0.74   0.29   2.08 
24 Any restrictions on sex are pointless and cruel       0.41   -1.29   -1.31   -0.99   
25 People should feel safe and free to have open conversations about their sexual 
desires    0.41   0.84 0.67   1.10    
26 Some relationships are romantic and sexual, but some are just sexual    0.92    -0.39   -0.01   -0.72   
27 Julie and Mark could learn a lot about themselves     0.55   -0.89   -0.66   -0.26   
28 There can be negative consequences to sex other than unwanted pregnancy and 
STIs -0.97   0.83   1.18    1.11 
29 Julie and Mark say sex brought them closer together    1.13    -0.26   -0.30   -0.94   
30 Making short-term decisions about sex could impact    -1.22   1.29 1.75    1.87    
31 People should refrain from immediate sexual gratification if it could impact their 
future goals -1.02   0.93    1.24    1.67 
32 Sexual experiences in the present should not be limited by worrying about the 
future 0.49   -1.25   -0.04   -0.46   
33 As long as no one gets hurt, there is no such thing as immoral sex    0.70   -1.55   0.40   -1.10   
34 Abortion and medication could fix any consequences    0.72   -1.25   -0.14   -0.42   
35 Julie and Mark did something wrong because the culture they live in says so    -0.53   0.11   0.54   -0.95 
36 Sexual morality comes from understanding human nature and the purpose of sex    -1.41   1.70    -1.63   1.81    
37 No form of sex is 100% safe from pregnancy and risk of disease    -0.83   0.59   0.88    0.89   
38 Sex between a brother and a sister destroys the sibling relationship    -1.83   1.32    1.94    -0.66   
39 Performing such a taboo sexual act could lead to more risky sexual behavior    -1.21   0.78   1.56    0.61   
40 Julie and Mark's friends and family would think differently about them if they 
found out    -0.82   1.39    1.58    0.54 
41 People who have incestuous relationships should not hold some jobs within a civil 
society -1.43   0.29   -0.03   -1.25   
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